PAKISTANI FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE IMPLIES FURTHER DRIFT AWAY FROM U.S.
Since the November 26 incident where NATO/ISAF attacked a Pakistani border post, claiming the lives of 28 troops, Washington’s overtures have failed to impress Islamabad. Fearing a backlash from an angry public and enraged military establishment, the late Benazir Bhutto’s successors have passed the buck onto the Parliament for “advice” on rules of engagement with the U.S.. So far, these relations have been the exclusive domain of the deep state, comprising mainly of the military and bureaucratic elite of the Islamic republic. Whatever the conclusions of the legislature may be, their standing will be anything but mandatory.
BACKGROUND: Islamabad best served U.S. interests when its military generals, not elected politicians, ruled Pakistan. Pervez Musharraf single-handedly bartered preferential room for U.S. demands to buy legitimacy internationally that he could never achieve at home. The general opened a vital logistical supply route to landlocked Afghanistan for NATO, agreed to CIA sting operations on Pakistani soil, and allowed U.S. drone operations in the country’s tribal areas along the Afghan border. The Pakistani public was later outraged at the frequency and casualties of drone attacks in the summer of 2010, when the country was battered by the worst floods in its history. Simultaneously, photos of American helicopters airlifting flood victims and airdropping food packets in the northern hamlets of Gilgit were displayed in national media. Both conservatives and liberals picked visuals of their liking to condemn or commend the U.S. actions. After the killing of three civilians on a Lahore artery, the much discussed presence of Blackwater or XE consultants was exposed beyond denial. However, thanks to Saudi clout, the American contractor escaped a jail term after paying hefty blood money to the aggrieved families.
While the Pakistani public was fuming over the Lahore episode, the killing of Osama Bin Laden in May, 2011, shattered Pakistan’s international image as a frontline ally. For about a week, the political and military leadership in Islamabad remained in a coma. While the liberal minority lauded the need of U.S. action to eliminate bin Laden, most Pakistanis either dismissed his existence in an Abbotabad cantonment or raised questions of violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty. While Islamabad fell short of bluntly admitting incompetence or failure to hunt bin Ladin down, politicians and the military elite unanimously condemned the breach of sovereignty while the Supreme Court set up a commission to investigate the matter. Thus, another issue was brushed under the carpet. Legislators in Washington hailed the Pakistani physician, Dr. Shakil Afridi, whose polio vaccine stunt affirmed CIA intelligence about bin Laden’s whereabouts in Abbotabad; Islamabad is trying him on treason charges for withholding vital information and bringing humility to the country.
With drone action intensifying in the tribal areas, NATO containers and tankers taking vital supplies for troops from Karachi to Kabul or Kandahar suffer increasing attacks by unidentified groups. In late November, NATO helicopters allegedly crossed into the Pakistani border to raze a Mohmand Agency post, killing 24 Pakistani officers and soldiers. In reaction, Pakistan severed NATO’s supply lines, boycotted the Bonn Conference and issued a deadline to vacate the Shamsi Air Base in Baluchistan province. Washington’s statement of regret over the deaths added fuel to the fire as Islamabad sought an unconditional apology from the highest level.
IMPLICATIONS: Since the November attack, Islamabad has turned away several American delegates such as Washington’s special envoy Mark Grossman and CENTCOM Commander General James Mattis. Now that parliament is holding a joint session to debate the basis for Pakistan’s future relationship with the U.S., the season for washing dirty laundry in public has begun. An alleged memo written on the behest of Pakistan’s then ambassador to Washington Hussain Haqqani has already exposed the backdoor channels both “allies” have been using to further a relationship that can best be described as transactional and hollow. Though the former ambassador denies ever authoring a memo to seek Washington’s help in averting a coup after the bin Laden debacle in Pakistan, there is no denying that there are dozens of such cables which lie buried in secret files of the 64-year long history of this bilateral relationship.
With nationalist fervor running high, Pakistani leaders undermine the U.S. monetary assistance provided since Musharraf abandoned the Taliban in 2001. Against the U.S. claims of billions of dollars pumped into the Pakistani economy as aid, Islamabad presents its own calculations. The Economic Survey of Pakistan, a baseline document prepared by the Ministry of Finance, claims that the 9/11 decade cost Pakistan direct and indirect losses worth US$ 67.93 billion. Spelled out for debate in the joint sitting of the Parliament, recommendations of the multi-party Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) seek an unconditional apology for the November checkpoint attack, an end to drone attacks and a pledge for no future hot pursuit inside Pakistan, compliance of which may then lead to a resumption of vital NATO supplies but with the imposition of taxes and duties that were never levied so far.
For the corruption-tainted elected rulers of Pakistan, the parliamentary passage of unanimous and workable terms of engagement with the U.S. would be a big deal. To discredit the Zardari-led government, the opposition parties are mulling to take a radically anti-U.S. stance, thus the debate may end up benefiting the deep state or establishment.
With the likelihood of snap polls in September or October, political parties are already in campaign mode. A consensus on the basic framework for such vital foreign policy questions remains a far cry, thus the military and political elite will continue to work discreetly with the U.S. on an issue-to-issue basis. Growing anger against foreign troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s potential role in taming the Taliban may considerably reduce the risk of hot pursuit inside the country’s territory besides a noticeable drop in drone strikes.
The return of U.S. security contractors and resumption of NATO supply lines are now issues beyond the nod of President Zardari or Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kyani. From hardline Islamists to center-right politicians like Imran Khan, Pakistan’s unchecked support for U.S. objectives in the Afghan campaign is to be blamed for terrorist acts and suicide bombings across the country. Even the liberal-minded PPP and left-leaning Pashtun nationalists have shied away from taking a softer stance in favor of opening the vital supply route to landlocked Afghanistan.
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher’s proposed resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives over unrest in Baluchistan province has largely been seen as an attempt to punish Islamabad for its categorical stance on relations with the U.S. More fireworks are likely as the U.S. gears up for the presidential election campaign. The two countries’ bilateral ties have undoubtedly become politicized. While the 2014 deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan will be high on Barack Obama’s campaign agenda, most pro-U.S. politicians in Pakistan are unlikely to risk their approvals by softening their tones.
CONCLUSIONS: The parliamentary debate on foreign policy may not produce pragmatic guidelines with or without consensus, but the move surely sets a precedent for the incumbent legislature. Owing to its vibrant and outspoken media and changing political status quo, public opinion will factor in significantly in Pakistan’s engagement with the U.S.. The U.S. and Pakistan both appear to assume that the bilateral relationship is incidental rather than long term. Washington fears the emergence of safe havens for militants in Afghanistan and Pakistani tribal areas after its troops’ exit, while Islamabad doubts a long-term U.S. commitment to the Afghan people, suspecting that the U.S. will simply abandon Afghanistan and impose vast sanctions on its eastern neighbor.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Naveed Ahmad is an investigative journalist and academic focusing on diplomacy, security, energy and democratization. His work has been published by media outlets and think-tanks in Asia, Europe and the U.S.
