CLASH BETWEEN TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN UNDERLINES RISK OF WAR IN CENTRAL ASIA
The collapse of the USSR intensified the already existing ethnic rivalries between Central Asian ethnicities, which had now formed sovereign states. Tensions are exacerbated by competition for water and other resources and have in some cases made possible military conflict between these states. Uzbekistan’s conflict with Tajikistan is a telling example, since it has reinforced Tashkent’s desire for regional dominance and underscored the limitations to the role of great powers in the region. Developments over the last few years suggest that conflicts in Central Asia may develop between the regional states themselves as especially control over water is playing an increasingly important role in the geopolitical rivalry.
BACKGROUND: One significant feature of Central Asia’s geopolitics is a limited supply of water. The Vakhsh River starts in Tajikistan and feeds into one of the region’s major rivers, Amu Darya, which flows to Uzbekistan where the water is essential for cultivation of cotton, the major crop in the area. In 2008, Dushanbe decided to construct the Rogun hydropower station on the Vakhsh River. The project was designed during the Soviet era, yet the decline of Moscow’s power during the Gorbachev era and the civil war in Tajikistan prevented any work on the project. After a return to relative stability, the project was hampered by a lack of funds. Dushanbe assumed that Moscow would provide the necessary funds but the latter’s demand for actual control over the station in exchange led Dushanbe to disagree and negotiations led to nothing.
Dushanbe has lately been able to secure other funding, seemingly from Tehran, which has engaged in several hydroelectric projects in the area and regards Tajikistan, with which it enjoys cultural and ethnic links, as a sphere of influence. As a result, Dushanbe recently intensified the construction of the station. This has caused immediate reactions from Tashkent, which has sought to prevent the project from being completed at all costs while Dushanbe emphasizes that it will finish the project regardless of external pressure. The conflict over control of water provides additional reasons for Tashkent to increase its quest for regional domination, especially in dealing with relatively weak neighbors such as Tajikistan. While the presence of great and regional powers in the region is certainly part of the equation, their influence on Tashkent’s foreign policy behavior is seemingly becoming less important.
IMPLICATIONS: Tashkent has sought to assert a higher degree of independence from Russia than any other Central Asian country since the beginning of the post-Soviet era. After a temporary move back into Moscow’s fold following Western condemnation of the Andijan crackdown in 2005, the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 solidified Tashkent’s suspicion of Moscow’s policies. It resolutely rejected Putin’s plan for a Eurasian Union as a manifestation of Moscow’s residual imperialism. While Tashkent exhibits little fear or respect for Moscow, Washington has also lost the attraction it possessed in the early post-Soviet era. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan regardless of persistent instability along with its economic problems and cuts in military budgets all suggest to Tashkent that U.S. resources are not as great as one could believe in the early post-Soviet era. At the same time, U.S. official visits including the recent visit of Secretary of State Clinton which offered to restore military aid in non-lethal defensive weapons to Uzbekistan induce President Karimov to assume that Washington would turn a blind eye to Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record in exchange for geopolitical advantages. This provides Tashkent with a considerable degree of independence from some of the major players in the region, encouraging its own ambitions of regional dominance.
Karimov regards Uzbekistan as the leader of Central Asia due to the fact that it is the most populous country in the region. He has evoked the legacy of Timur, the medieval ruler who controlled most of Central Asia and beyond in the 14th century, to bolster his claim. Despite the extreme brutality of Timur’s conquest, he has been transformed into a national hero and proclaimed to be the founder of the Uzbek nation, and the official propaganda has made him a great promoter of art and architecture, in addition to military might. Timur has become a sort of ancient embodiment of Karimov, and it is becoming clear that Karimov will not tolerate open challenges to Tashkent’s predominance, as is the case with Dushanbe.
Dushanbe has stated that the Rogun station is absolutely essential for the development of its electricity supply. Tashkent’s view is quite different and for legitimate reasons. If constructed, the station would regulate the flow of water and make Uzbekistan’s agriculture dependent on Dushanbe’s good will. Dushanbe could also use water as a trade commodity and relate the supply of water to Tashkent’s delivery of gas. Finally, water supply could be used as a means of political pressure. The project would not only prevent Tashkent from realizing its ambition of securing Uzbekistan’s regional dominance but would actually make Uzbekistan dependent on Dushanbe.
Dushanbe has hardly concealed its displeasure with Tashkent’s ambitions and has put forward claims of its own. In the view of official Tajik historians, Tajiks as Iranian speaking Indo-Europeans are the true autochthonous residents of Central Asia. They are also representatives of the great “Aryan” civilization, the only true civilization of Central Asia, where they are juxtaposed to brutal Turkic nomads, such as Uzbeks. Therefore, Dushanbe ideologists have proclaimed that Uzbeks have no right to tell them what to do. In addition, Dushanbe has proclaimed that many regions of Uzbekistan actually belong to Tajikistan. Ancient and important sites such as Bukhara and Samarkand are considered to be historically Tajik cities and thus appropriated illegally by Uzbekistan. Tashkent has, of course, disagreed and stated its own claims on territories and resources. Thus, the conflict over the Rogun project has been incorporated into a broader quest for regional hegemony.
Unsurprisingly, Tashkent has engaged in frantic attempts to stop the project. For example, it has proclaimed that it is not seismically stable and that the dams could collapse and cause catastrophic flooding in case of an earthquake. Dushanbe has proclaimed that it needs the station to generate electricity for production of aluminum, which Tashkent asserts will lead to horrible pollution and seriously damage the population’s health. Yet, the major arguments consist in coercion. Tashkent has increased the gas prices for Tajikistan, delayed railway freight to Tajikistan through Uzbekistan and on occasion even deployed troops along the common border under the excuse of fighting terrorism or smugglers. It is clear that Tashkent does not exclude the use of force in safeguarding its interests and possesses the means for doing this. Tashkent commands one of the strongest armies in the region and did contemplate an invasion to prevent the mass killings of Uzbeks during the 2010 unrest in Kyrgyzstan.
Dushanbe has sought to counter Tashkent’s pressure by building relationships with stronger powers in the region. It enjoys a productive relationship with Tehran and has demonstrated a special attachment to China. Indeed, as a sign of its predisposition towards Beijing, Dushanbe recently provided considerable Tajik territory for cultivation by Chinese farmers. It also retreated from its confrontational position toward Russia and keeps Russian troops in the country. Yet, China has an equally close relationship with Tashkent and Tehran’s international problems preclude any substantial engagement in a potential Central Asian conflict. In addition, neither Russia, nor the U.S. would fully back Dushanbe, for a variety of reasons. These realities could embolden Tashkent to engage in limited regional conflicts similar to the war between Russia and Georgia and the ongoing quarrel over water could well trigger such a development.
CONCLUSIONS: Competition between external great powers, such as the U.S., Russia and China, and regional powers such as Turkey and Iran, for influence in Central Asia is well known. Yet, developments over the last few years suggest that conflicts in Central Asia may also develop between the regional states themselves as especially control over water is playing an increasingly important role in the geopolitical rivalry. The geopolitical picture of Central Asia is becoming quite convoluted and fragmented, and future military conflict between the Central Asian states cannot be excluded. In such case, conflict would not necessarily constitute a Cold War-type war of proxies, since regional powers in Central Asia and elsewhere (e.g. in the Middle East) are acquiring a considerable level of geopolitical autonomy.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History, Indiana University at South Bend.
