In June 2011, President Obama announced the withdrawal of 10,000 troops from Afghanistan. Another 23,000 are scheduled to pull out by next summer, and all American troops will return home by 2014. Although the U.S. has a clear intention to end the war, some pessimistic voices warn that it will be a critical blow to U.S. security and a retreat in the war on terror. However, a sober analysis shows that the U.S. still has a range of strategic options that would protect major U.S. interests in post-American Afghanistan and minimize the negative consequences of the withdrawal.
BACKGROUND: The Afghan war has been the longest in the U.S. history. It has already cost almost half a trillion dollars, and more than 1,700 American troops have died in combat. Over the past years, U.S. public opinion has been increasingly turning against the war. According to the polls, a majority of Americans see the Afghan war as not worth fighting. With the growing anti-American sentiments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. has fewer reasons than ever to wage the unpopular war. The death of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011 created a symbolic accomplishment for the U.S. in the prolonged engagement, which might have tipped public opinion even more allowing for U.S. withdrawal under the banner of success.
The remaining concern is that the Afghan army will be incapable to fight the Taliban after the Americans and NATO leave. As many fear, with the current momentum, the Taliban will defeat the Karzai government and establish a jihadist regime creating terrorist threats to the U.S. and its allies. While it is hard to deny that the Karzai government will be weakened by the American departure, it does not necessarily mean that it will have no chance against the Taliban. Building the capacity of the Afghan army and police can still be a huge factor of success of the counter-insurgency operation. From previous experience, after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989, the Afghan army successfully defended itself against Mujahidin and even launched a series of victorious counter-attacks in 1990-1991. But what happens in the “worst-case scenario”, if the Karzai government does fall?
IMPLICATIONS: There are several options that the U.S. can pursue. The first one is to keep Afghanistan disintegrated between various warring factions by providing some support to each of them with one major purpose – to prevent the rise of Al Qaeda and other anti-American terrorist groups. In some sense, this strategy is similar to the British policy in the 19th Century, which was designed to buy the loyalty of Afghan tribes in order to forestall Russian overtures. Cash for loyalty may not be very effective, though. In the 1980s, various Mujahidin factions did compete for American money but they did not become any friendlier to the U.S. as a result. There is no guarantee that U.S. funds will not end up in an organization similar to Al Qaeda, which would use them against the U.S.
An alternative plan would be to sponsor a broad coalition government, which would cooperate with the U.S. in keeping Al Qaeda and other radical groups down. The hard question is: if this task has not been achieved even with 100,000 American troops on the ground, why would it become more feasible after the U.S. leaves? Historically, coalitions never worked well in Afghanistan. Afghan rulers preferred to consolidate their power through brutal suppression and military force. Afghan politics have always been dominated by the principle “winner takes all”, and no attempts to end civil war through national reconciliation processes, such as in 1985-89 and 1992-96, have succeeded.
The third plan would be to let the strongest Afghan party monopolize the power. If, as a result, the Taliban win, it will pose a serious challenge for the U.S. But it does not mean that dealing with the Taliban will be impossible. Afghanistan will desperately need economic assistance and international recognition, both of which the U.S. will be able to provide. Some areas might even see substantial progress, such as, for example, the elimination of illegal drug trafficking. The Taliban could restore their 2001 ban on poppy, which almost wiped out opium production in less than one year. Eradication of terrorist networks in Afghanistan will remain a difficult task. It will not, however, be much different from American efforts in many other countries such as Pakistan, Sudan, or Yemen. The U.S. will certainly maintain a significant economic and political leverage to make the new Taliban more receptive to U.S. demands.
Neighboring states may benefit from this policy too. Iran, Central Asian countries, and Pakistan have influences in Afghanistan and can offer their support for the U.S. strategy in exchange for some perks. On the global level such a strategy will encounter neither surprise, nor major opposition. Pursuing national interests through pulling economic and political strings has been a common policy of great powers for centuries. It is hard to predict which scenario will most likely occur. For a long time, the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has been driven by a belief in a military solution, which rejected the very idea of negotiating with the Taliban. For many Americans, it is still difficult to accept a Taliban comeback. The insurgents, in turn, have refused to participate in any peace talks until the “foreign occupiers” leave the country.
While the first rumors of negotiations began circulating in 2010, it took almost two years before the U.S. and the Taliban announced a pilot round of talks in Qatar in January 2012. Despite this progress, however, hopes for a peaceful transition would be premature. There are many bitter enemies of the Taliban in Karzai’s government, as well as in the Afghan army and security forces, especially in the northern and western provinces. Even if the U.S. cuts a deal with the Taliban, it will not likely prevent fighting after the withdrawal. Much depends on the Taliban themselves. If the new Taliban soften their radical image, the U.S. will have more reasons to legitimize them. But if the Taliban re-appear as intractable fanatics, the U.S. might turn to the “British” recipe and support the Northern Alliance and other Taliban rivals, thus prolonging the low intensity conflict in Afghanistan for the indefinite future.
CONCLUSIONS: It is always painful for a great power to lose a small war. But history shows that the consequences of withdrawal are often less ominous than many predict. When the French left Algeria in 1962, the Portuguese said good bye to Angola in 1975, and the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, it happened because continuing war was more damaging than ending it. The U.S. seems to be in a similar situation in Afghanistan. The withdrawal will not be an easy solution. It will certainly leave Afghanistan with less hope for peace, economic stability, and prospects for women’s rights. But strategically, the U.S. will be able to pursue its interests, even if a radical force comes to power in Afghanistan. It will require some difficult compromises but it will save hundreds if not thousands of human lives and gigantic material resources, while still maintaining a large degree of U.S. influence in the region.
Author’s bio: Yury V. Bosin holds a Ph.D. in Asian Studies from the Russian Academy of Sciences and is presently conducting doctoral research in the Department of Political Science at the University of New Mexico. His most recent work is “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union: Why the Impact of U.S. Assistance Has Been Below Expectations” forthcoming in International Studies Quarterly (March 2012).