Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus recently agreed on a Customs Union and Russia has proclaimed its ambition to create a more integrated political body – the Eurasian Union – in the future. Russia, the largest of the countries involved, has promised that the Union would be based on absolute equality. However, Russia’s approach to Tajikistan – a potential participant of the Union – have put Russian intentions into doubt and have apparently made the other prospective members the Union consider other options to prevent Russia’s absolute domination in the post-Soviet space. Some post-Soviet states have flatly rejected the idea of the Union.
BACKGROUND: Tajikistan is one of the poorest and most underdeveloped countries of the former USSR and has had the most unstable and bloody post-Soviet history, ravaged by a bloody Civil War in the beginning of its existence as an independent state. Its relations to other former USSR states have been complicated, including occasional clashes with neighboring Uzbekistan and an unstable relationship with Russia. Yet, Moscow’s strategy toward Dushanbe has been based on Tajikistan’s limited geopolitical options. Consequently, Dushanbe’s future membership in the Eurasian Union would pose an example to other Central Asian states, which are still hesitant toward the project. Moscow has asserted that its desire to construct the Union stems purely from economic considerations and would be beneficial for all sides involved, while it has denied the existence of any hidden agenda behind the project. In reality, the Eurasian Union would serve to transform a large part of Central Asia into an exclusive sphere of influence for Moscow, a design from which it would reap mostly economic benefits.
Dushanbe’s recent behavior clearly contradicts Moscow plans in this regard. Indeed, Tajikistan has sought to establish a “multi-vector foreign policy,” a type of foreign policy behavior the Kremlin has worked hard to eradicate in the post-Soviet space. The approach builds on a strategy of simultaneously cultivating several foreign relationships in order to reduce dependence on a single actor, a strategy Moscow has frequently employed and regards as a manifestation of its geopolitical savvy. However, Moscow is strongly opposed to the idea that other former Soviet states would follow the same strategy. While Moscow has problems in dealing with Dushanbe, Dushanbe has particular grievances of its own. The tension caused Moscow to employ a final demonstration of force with the purpose of setting an example to other Central Asian states how Moscow intends to deal with those who cross its way and it would deal with future members of the Eurasian Union.
In November 2011, an airplane crossed into Tajikistan’s airspace from Afghanistan and landed on Tajik territory. The airplane was not registered in any state and had no permission either to cross the airspace or to land. Consequently, Dushanbe decided to demonstrate both Tajikistan’s sovereignty and its displeasure with Moscow. The airplane was confiscated and the pilots, one of which was a Russian citizen, were arrested and received harsh sentences. This infuriated Moscow, which rapidly turned to power politics against Tajikistan, regardless of any pronouncements about its intentions to treat other post-Soviet states, including prospective members of the Eurasian Union, as equals. The assumption that international law would be applied indiscriminately was ruled out as the Russian elite immediately started to propose and implement repressive policies.
IMPLICATIONS: These policies have two major components; one military and one economic. Of these, implemented policies against Tajikistan mainly consist of economic sanctions. Yet, some Moscow officials have suggested that Dushanbe understands only force and that Russia should employ it. Russia has a military base in Tajikistan and soldiers based there could be well used to liberate the pilots. While the use force was considered a too risky enterprise, other means for applying pressure were much easier to employ and have been utilized by Moscow in the past. In this case, Moscow “discovered” problems with agricultural products from Tajikistan while the most damaging measure from Tajikistan’s perspective was Moscow’s targeting of Tajik guest workers. During the rise of tensions between Moscow and Dushanbe, the Kremlin proclaimed that Tajik guest workers are the source of all evils, considered responsible for spread of diseases, crime, etc. Hundreds were arrested, their work and resident permits were annulled or plainly torn into pieces in front of them, and a significant number were deported. Finally, Dushanbe succumbed to Moscow’s pressure and released the pilots.
The events are likely to have repercussions for the prospect of building a Eurasian Union, as well as for Moscow’s general relationship with former Soviet states. First, it reaffirms the perecption, already formed during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, that Moscow is not only prepared to employ force in dealing with its neighbors; it also does not exclude using military bases located in other states for “regime change” if needed. Secondly, any economic dependence on Moscow is dangerous for it could well be used as tool to force the submission of rebellious vassals. These facts are certainly not novel for the leaders of former USSR states. The treatment of Dushanbe just reaffirmed their old views and will definitely continue to shape their views of Moscow’s proposed geopolitical constructions, including the “Eurasian Union.”
This does not mean that the Central Asian countries would seek to depart from Russian influence. Rather, Russia’s behavior encourages them to build relationships with alternative geopolitical players if possible. In any case, Moscow could hardly expect that they would regard it and its Eurasian Union as the only geopolitical alternative. Even for those who already joined the Custom Union – viewed by Moscow as the first step toward building a more integrated Eurasian Union – the search for other geopolitical options continues.
Dushanbe will most likely continue building its relationship with Teheran, which provides it with substantial help and clearly supports it in the conflict with Uzbekistan. In addition, Dushanbe will exclude neither China, nor the West from its geopolitical options. Bishkek is likely to follow suit. Indeed, while proclaiming its close ties with Russia and desire to join the Eurasian Union, Kyrgyzstan has at the same time sought to develop its contacts with other countries such as Turkey, which the newly elected Kyrgyz president visited recently. Finally, Uzbekistan has flatly rejected the idea of the Union. In one of his recent speeches, President Karimov proclaimed that Uzbekistan remembers the oppressive Soviet rule well and regards the Customs and Eurasian Unions as Russian imperialism in disguise. Tashkent clearly regards China as its major partner and has sought to forge its relationship with the West in general and Washington in particular, which seems ready to overlook Karimov’s dictatorial rule due to Tashkent’s strategic importance. Even Kazakhstan, a co-founder of the Customs Union and a seemingly staunch supporter of Eurasian integration, continues to be cautious regarding Moscow’s intentions and its dealings with Dushanbe hardly dispelled Kazakh skepticism about Moscow. Indeed, after the recent riots in Kazakhstan, one Kazakhstani official accused several countries of fomenting the revolts; Russia was one of them.
CONCLUSIONS: Russia proclaims that the creation of a Customs Union and plans for a much closer Eurasian Union build on absolute equality of all members, with the intention of attracting other former Soviet states to the Union. However, Moscow’s policy toward Tajikistan indicates that it tends to follow neo-imperial political practices. While this does not preclude the Central Asian states from accepting some of Moscow’s propositions, it simultaneously highlights their desire to follow “multi-vector” foreign policies where Russia is just one among many possible players. This implies that Central Asia will continue to lack a strong geopolitical patron and prevents the countries of the region from developing common foreign policies. It also creates problems both for the countries of the region to cooperate over common threats (such as jihadism) and for major global players vying for influence in Central Asia.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History, Indiana University at South Bend.