Since late last year, a new round of tensions has emerged between Dushanbe and Tashkent. In early November 2011, a skirmish occurred on the Tajik-Uzbek border near the Uzbek town of Bekobod and the Tajik town of Khujand, resulting in the death of an Uzbek border soldier. The Uzbek border authorities rushed to connect the skirmish to drug trafficking into Uzbekistan, with the support of Tajik border guards. The later joint Uzbek-Tajik investigation concluded that the incident was an attempt to smuggle electric appliances by private individuals from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan. It is, however, unclear why this led the Uzbek government to mass a large amount of military hardware on the Tajik border.

In mid-November, Uzbekistan unilaterally closed a railway line between the Uzbek town of Termez and the Tajik city of Qurghonteppa in Khatlon oblast, not far from Uzbekistan's border with Tajikistan and Afghanistan. After a few days of silence, Uzbek authorities explained the shutdown of rail traffic as the result of an explosion, a mysterious terrorist attack that damaged the connecting railway bridge.

Tajikistan largely relies on its neighbors, and especially Uzbekistan’s railroads and highways, for overland transportation infrastructure. The railway stretch impacted by the explosion happens to be vital for transporting fuel, food and other supplies to Khatlon oblast in Southern Tajikistan, whose remoteness makes resupply via Tajikistan’s infrastructure costly and impractical during winter.

The railroad remains closed, which has resulted in as many as 300 freight cars being stuck in Uzbekistan. These hold all sorts of goods and essentials, including humanitarian aid. This has caused substantial shortages and financial losses in Tajikistan and induced scarcity and price hikes in Khatlon oblast. The head of the World Food Program, Alzira Ferreira has accused the Uzbek authorities of deliberately refusing to allow freight and warned that such substantial delays may have severe consequences for the local population.

Different Tajik and foreign media outlets, recently Eurasianet.org, expressed skepticism toward Uzbek explanations involving terrorist attacks and subsequent difficulties in restoring the damaged railroad, questioning the real reasons behind the long-lasting railroad blockade. Uzbek authorities have sealed the site of the alleged railway explosion from public access and denied all official Tajik requests for more information and offers to join in repairing any damage to the railroad. In the past three years, Uzbekistan has on several occasions used road breakdowns and other pretexts to deliberately block and delay freight to Tajikistan. The last such boycott in 2010 was a display of Uzbekistan’s disapproval of the Tajik decision to go ahead with constructing the Rogun hydropower station.

The railway line impacted by the recent alleged explosion is, however, not used to transport construction materials for Rogun. The railroad sabotage might be an attempt to damage Tajikistan economically and remind it of its vulnerability and dependence on Uzbekistan. Dissatisfaction with the continuous construction of the Rogun project remains a motive as well. As economist Hojimuhammad Umarov opined, Uzbekistan might simply be trying to worsen the dreadful economic situation in Tajikistan and to stoke popular sentiments against Tajikistan’s president. Another potential reason for Uzbekistan’s behavior is Tajik rail officials’ expressions of interest in expanding collaboration with NATO on the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), suggesting diverting some NDN supplies through Tajikistan. Currently, most NDN supplies cross the Termez-Hairatan “Friendship Bridge” between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Redirecting more NDN traffic through southern Tajikistan via the Tajik-Afghan Bridge would be a financial gain for Tajikistan and a loss for Uzbekistan.

Tensions have continued into 2012. On January 1, Uzbekistan raised the tariffs for goods carried by rail to Tajikistan by 32 percent. This is quite acute, considering Tajikistan’s heavy dependence on imports. According to the deputy head of the Tajik State Railroad Company Usmon Qalandarov, such an increase means that the transit of one ton of wheat flour across Uzbek territory that previously cost US$ 74 would now cost around US$ 88. To compensate for the losses, and to retaliate, Tajikistan has increased the tariffs for Uzbek rail transit across the Northern Sogd region. Tajikistan has also asked the Uzbek side to reconsider its position, since Tajik freight travels only about 109 miles through Uzbek territory and there should be a ceiling on transit prices.

Within days of the transit price hikes, on January 4 Uzbekistan completely halted gas supplies to Tajikistan without any prior notifications. Supplies resumed a week later, after re-negotiations. The official Uzbek explanations for the incident quoted the fact that no new supply contract with Tajikistan was in place. Tajik authorities replied that Uzbekistan had shunned negotiations in spite of several Tajik attempts to initiate these in the latter part of 2011, starting as early as August.

The incidents exacerbate difficulties in Tajik-Uzbek diplomatic relations. Focusing on the various drivers of the conflict, some analysts cite the risk of armed conflict between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Yet all the problematic areas of Tajik-Uzbek relations could probably be resolved if the two countries became more inclined toward policies of mutual compromise, however this is not happening.

While cooperation is possible, it largely depends on relations between the two leaders, whose personal ambitions can dramatically affect policies and populations, given the political authoritarianism in both countries. The manifest lack of a desire to compromise reflects a deep-seated personal animosity between the Uzbek and Tajik presidents. Consequently, Uzbekistan is pressuring Tajikistan on transit routes, electricity and gas supply, and common borders. In turn, Tajikistan continues to promote the construction of the Rogun hydropower station on the Vaksh River, which would give Dushanbe an opportunity to regulate the water flow into Uzbekistan, a long-desired leverage. Both countries use every occasion to blame each other for miscellaneous mischief, thus raising anti-Uzbek and anti-Tajik sentiments respectively among the local populations. This may in turn prove the greatest danger, given the large Uzbek and Tajik minorities in the two states.