CSTO SUMMIT RAISES AMBIGUITY REGARDING UZBEKISTAN’S MEMBERSHIP
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), involving 7 CIS members, each held summits in Moscow on December 20, 2011, where Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov took part. In October, 2011, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made a highly critical statement towards Uzbekistan for the “triple game” the country plays in its foreign policy. Such a game is incompatible with Uzbekistan’s membership in the CSTO, Lukashenko said. Uzbekistan’s participation in the CSTO and CIS summits two months later can be considered a response to Lukashenko’s critique.
BACKGROUND: Lukashenko’s statement appeared as an ultimatum due to his emphasis on the “triple game” Uzbekistan is playing and its implications for the country’s continued CSTO membership. The statement was made during the last meeting of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly, where Lukashenko pointed out Uzbekistan’s reluctance to take a more active part in some projects within the organization, especially activities related to the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces and Collective Peacekeeping Forces. Lukashenko also reminded that Uzbekistan has not ratified any of the organization’s essential documents. The Belarusian President warned that without the CSTO, it will be difficult for Uzbekistan to safeguard its independence; “we shouldn’t joke here; the world today is very unstable.”
In April the same year, Lukashenko had delivered another critical and paradoxical statement: “If the CSTO could not react timely to and exert influence on the situation in Kyrgyzstan, well, that is the organization we have. What kind of organization keeps silence when bloodshed happens in one of its member countries? If this is going to continue then it doesn’t have any perspective. Only Belarus and Russia have similar points of view and positions on all questions. Other states have their own points of view and positions.”
In these two critical appearances of the Belarusian President, he first pointed out all other members except for Russia and Belarus as sources of divergences and disunity among the member countries. The second statement singled out Uzbekistan as a member causing problems for the CSTO. Thus, according to Lukashenko, only Russia and Belarus have the right positions within the CSTO, while Uzbekistan is especially problematic. Lukashenko’s statements revealed not only his own political bias but also the persistence of geopolitics and ambiguity concerning integration processes in the post-Soviet space. These circumstances are especially challenging for Uzbekistan.
IMPLICATIONS: The decision to hold the CIS summit simultaneously with the CSTO summit was illustrative and symptomatic in several respects. It was not the first occasion when the organizers attempted to combine the summits of the two organizations. The event coincided with Putin’s proclamation of his new doctrine of a Eurasian Union. Moreover, these meetings took place within the context of the ongoing electoral campaign in Russia where presidential elections are scheduled for March 2012.
Another important contextual factor relates to the new situation in Afghanistan following the drawdown of international forces and the increasing operation of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The CSTO’s Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha said the member states came to an agreement on joint measures in case the situation in Afghanistan exacerbates after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014. A joint action plan will be worked out for such a case.
The summit once again revealed the organization’s geopolitical character. In the aftermath of the CSTO summit, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev informed ambiguously that one of the meeting’s results was an agreement on coordination between all member states regarding the deployment of military installations of foreign countries, which are not members of the organization, on their territories. From now on, he said, the consent of all CSTO members will be required for the deployment of military bases of any third country on the territory of a CSTO member state. According to Nazarbayev, this confirms the unity of the organization and the commitment of all its members to the alliance. The statement’s ambiguity about foreign military bases deployed in the territory of the CSTO member-states relates to whether this quasi-alliance has any real capacity to guarantee the security of all its members, a question that still remains open. It becomes clear that the region’s strategic equation includes multiple constants and variables, in particular the role of international forces in Afghanistan, interactions between the U.S. and Russia in the region, as well as the presence and activity of international organizations with their security-related programs and missions in Central Asia.
In this complicated context, Karimov’s participation in the CIS and CSTO summits in Moscow may either have confirmed or dismissed Nazarbaev’s optimism about unity within the alliance relations. On the one hand, Karimov acknowledged the “historical role” the CIS has played throughout the post-Soviet period. He said it was difficult to imagine what would have happened if the CIS had not existed. On the other hand, his attendance at the CSTO summit was more reserved. His seeming optimism about the CIS and moderate “no-veto approach” to the CSTO’s decision regarding the deployment of foreign military bases, once again reflected Tashkent’s “one-step forward, one step back” strategic posture within these two post-Soviet structures.
At the CIS summit, Uzbekistan’s position was expressed in terms of its long-term national interests, which are connected to the country’s need for modernization and for cooperation to correspond with its national legislation and international obligations. Karimov confirmed that Uzbekistan remains in the organization but failed to demonstrate any clear desire to reduce its cooperation with the U.S. A strategic partnership agreement between the U.S. and Uzbekistan is in force since 2002. Today, Uzbekistan together with all CSTO members is part of the NDN which, among other things, requires mutual trust and cooperation not only between the CSTO members but also between them and the U.S./NATO.
From this point of view, the last CIS and CSTO summits largely constituted new attempts to assert the importance of these structures in the post-Soviet geopolitical space vis-à-vis the volatile geopolitical situation brought about during 2011. While the summits did not provide any conclusive statement on Uzbekistan’s participation in the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces for Central Asia, they did publicize Karimov’s new message that “Uzbekistan is an important and attractive partner.” Thus, Lukashenko’s ultimatum was not taken seriously.
CONCLUSIONS: The CIS and CSTO summits in Moscow seem to have been preceded by an ultimate warning from Belarus and Russia towards Uzbekistan to make a choice regarding the direction of its foreign policy. The summits coincided in time with the new strategic turn in Afghanistan and expectations to coordinate policies ahead of the Russian presidential elections. The CSTO agreement on foreign military bases was not so much on the bases per se, but rather an ambiguous message to the CSTO members and Russia’s geopolitical competitors. Given the mostly Russia-centric nature of the CIS and CSTO, security and integration in the post-Soviet space still cannot be regarded as a genuinely multilateral endeavor. The new stage of post-Soviet regional integration will depend on Russia’s attitude towards other former Soviet states. As many predict, Putin is highly likely to return to the presidency. While Putin’s critical attitude towards the West is well known, this is not necessarily shared by other post-Soviet states, particularly Central Asian ones. Thus, the geopolitical struggle for Central Asia will go on, as will the struggle of Central Asian states themselves for real independence.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science, and is an independent analyst based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
