The November 26 NATO air assault against two Pakistani border posts, killing two dozen Pakistanis, was the most serious “friendly fire” incident along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the decade-long NATO intervention. But the likelihood of cross-border incidents has increased since the involvement of Pakistan-based insurgents in the fighting in Afghanistan has prompted the Afghan and NATO governments to adopt a more vigorous policy along the frontier. The worsening relations between NATO and Pakistan and the closure of the border to NATO convoys has increased the importance of the Northern Distribution Network to the allied mission in Afghanistan, and has underscored the need to draft more effective rules of engagement in the border region.
BACKGROUND: The reasons for the border exchange remain under examination. Miscommunication, fear, and bad intelligence likely contributed to the disaster. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border is often poorly marked, and differs between maps by up to five miles in some places. It is even possible that the Taliban orchestrated an incident between Pakistan and NATO to keep them divided.
In any case, Pakistan has retaliated by closing its two Afghan crossings in Chaman and Torkham, in the northwest Khyber tribal area, to NATO’s supply convoys. Although the United States and other NATO countries have sought during the past two years to send more goods to their troops in Afghanistan through the new Northern Distribution Network, almost half of the supplies to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan pass through Pakistan.
Pakistan has also expelled U.S. forces from a military base in Baluchistan, boycotted the Bonn conference held to secure diplomatic and economic support for the Kabul government as NATO troops withdraw in coming years, and reinforced its border defenses. We now have a situation where both NATO coalition forces and Pakistani troops can engage targets across the border without seeking advanced permission in cases of self-defense. This is but the latest crisis to befall the border region during the last decade. A similar incident in September 2010 killed two Pakistani troops and led to the closure of one of NATO's supply routes through Pakistan for 10 days. Many NATO convoys were set alight or looted. This time the trucks have moved into more secure regions pending the frontier’s reopening.
The recent intensified fighting in Afghanistan has led U.S. officials to adopt a less tolerant attitude toward the Pakistan-based Islamists who conduct cross-border attacks. The White House and the Pentagon have, like their Afghan colleagues, become increasingly frustrated by the presence of the insurgent sanctuaries on Pakistani territory and the failure of the Pakistani government to establish control there. Taliban and Haqqani guerrillas are sallying forth from their sanctuaries in Pakistan and attacking Afghan army outposts in eastern Afghanistan, before fleeing back across the border with NATO aircrews in hot pursuit.
The Obama administration has authorized a more “proactive” air campaign against the Pakistani-based militants. While still declining to send U.S. ground forces across the border into Pakistan, the Pentagon increased the use of both manned helicopter attacks along the border and unmanned aerial vehicle strikes for striking targets deeper inside Pakistani territory.
IMPLICATIONS: Although this was the first friendly fire incident in 2011, this has been a terrible year in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, beginning with the Raymond Davis affair. Davis was a CIA contractor working under the cover of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad who shot two Pakistani men in January claiming they meant to rob him. The affair highlighted the complex relationship between the two intelligence agencies, whose members distrust one another even as they work together in joint operations. Many Pakistanis complain the incident exposed problems inherent in the large CIA presence in their country.
The White House then ordered the May 2 attack on bin Laden’s compound in central Pakistan without seeking Pakistani permission or notifying Pakistani authorities in advance. U.S. officials rightly feared that some Pakistani officials would warn bin Laden of any impending attack. But the strike embarrassed the Pakistani military, whose popularity has now rebounded since it claims that the recent NATO attack was an unprovoked and deliberate.
The U.S. has pursued several initiatives to reduce tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and to encourage both governments to concentrate their attention on countering the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists operating inside their territories. Since 2001, the U.S. has provided the Afghan and Pakistani governments and militaries with considerable money, training, equipment, and other security assistance. In addition, the U.S. has targeted some of its economic aid to the border region directly. Furthermore, the U.S. exchanges intelligence data directly with the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Finally, the U.S. has sought to enhance cooperation between the Afghan and Pakistani governments regarding security along their mutual border. Despite these efforts, the border region remains a major source of tension in their trilateral relationship.
Misperceptions regarding each other’s capabilities and intentions are also an enduring problem in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. U.S. officials and their NATO and Afghan allies believe that the Pakistani military could suppress the Afghan Taliban insurgents in the border areas if they really made an effort to do so. Meanwhile, Pakistani officials think that if the coalition really got its act together it could easily employ its overwhelming capabilities to crush the Taliban guerrillas and secure the Afghan-Pakistan border. The failure to do so gives rise to all sorts of suspicions that the U.S. is secretly sustaining the insurgency in order to justify its continued military presence in the region. They also believe that ineffective Afghan and NATO policies have contributed to the rise of the Afghan Taliban, and believe that some anti-Islamabad terrorists have been attacking Pakistani forces while using Afghan territory as a sanctuary. The parties’ clashing perceptions have been manifest in their firefights along the Afghan-Pakistan border, which involves their troops alternately cooperating and combating one another.
In addition, both Americans and Pakistanis have a perception that the other is ungrateful. Whereas Americans resent the fact of enduring Pakistani animosities toward the U.S. despite the billions in aid it has provided, Pakistanis gripe that Americans fail to appreciate all the sacrifices they have incurred in fighting terrorism. Pakistanis blame their financial losses and other costs on Islamabad’s decisions to join Washington’s war on terror after 9/11. However, the number of suicide attacks and Pakistani government and civilian casualties has only soared since the July 2007 military operation against the Red Mosque in Islamabad, following the kidnapping of several Chinese citizens. Pakistanis note that U.S. aid covers only a small percentage of those costs, and that even now the U.S. Congress is cutting back on earlier aid pledges, many of which remain unimplemented. They see the current criticism as simply an Afghan-U.S. effort to “scapegoat” Pakistan for their inability to reverse what looks to be a losing war.
Relations are likely to deteriorate further in the next year or two before hopefully rebounding. NATO governments are eager to secure a favorable military balance while they still have powerful military units in the country. Pakistani officials will hedge against the possibility that the Taliban will regain control of some, if not all, of Afghanistan, by maintaining operational ties with the group, despite Afghan and U.S. complaints. Both the U.S. and Pakistani incumbent administrations have incentives to act tough to boost their support in upcoming national elections.
CONCLUSIONS: Unfortunately, there is no easy way to reconcile to these differing priorities. Afghan-Pakistan-U.S. border tensions are likely to recur – and worsen – as NATO troops withdraw from Afghanistan. With official Afghan and U.S. backing, ISAF will increase its pressure on Pakistani authorities to prevent the Taliban from exploiting the vacuum, and will step up its attacks along the border, invariably causing more friendly-fire incidents. Geography and other factors force Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the U.S. to collaborate despite their differences over the border region. But an urgent task is to clarify the rules of engagement under the new conditions of a departing Western military presence, a resurgent Taliban, and a Pakistani government and military frustrated with the U.S. and Afghanistan but yet still open to some cooperation.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute.