In the first days of September, Tajikistan hosted the CIS Summit, a meeting of the “Dushanbe four”, and received consecutive official visits by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Both leaders perceive Tajikistan as a “strategic partner” in the Central Asian region. However, relations between Tajikistan and the two regional powers have developed quite differently. Relations between Tajikistan and Iran have seen positive developments in all fields including political, economic and cultural cooperation. By contrast, a number of unresolved and problematic issues exist in Tajikistan’s bilateral cooperation with Russia, which is aggravated by the polemic from both sides.
From September 2 to 5, Dushanbe hosted high level meetings and negotiations. Dushanbe hosted the third meeting of the “Dushanbe four”, where the presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia and Tajikistan discussed cooperation in the political and economic fields. The presidents first discussed security issues, and then focused on economic cooperation particularly in the energy field. Special attention was paid to the CASA-1000 Project, which aims at connecting the electric power systems of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with the corresponding systems of Afghanistan and Pakistan. After the negotiations, the Russian president made an official statement where he confirmed Russia’s interest in supporting the CASA-1000 Project, and even mentioned “hundreds of millions” to be provided by Russia for this project.
Local and Russian observers and media paid particular attention to the Russian president’s visit, which was expected to resolve a number of outstanding issues between the two countries, especially in the field of military cooperation (see the 08/17/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst [0]). According to experts, it was expected that the negotiations between Medvedev and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon would be among the toughest in the history of bilateral relations between the two countries, considering the major sticking points in their military and economic cooperation.
It should be recalled that Russian high level officials recently proposed to return Russian border troops to the Tajik-Afghan border, claiming that Tajikistan is incapable of protecting this border with its own forces and to stop drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Russia. Besides, Russia wants Tajikistan to allow deployment of Russian forces at its military airport Aini. In turn, high level Tajik officials proposed to demand rent for the Russian military base which is currently deployed in Tajikistan for free under a 10-year lease singed in 2004. In the leverage game, Russia pressures Tajikistan by playing the bargaining chip of almost 1 million Tajik labor migrants (every seventh Tajik) working in Russia and increasing its export fees for fuel which constitutes 90 percent of Tajikistan’s import for domestic consumption.
As Medvedev announced immediately after the negotiations, “Russia will stay in Tajikistan for another forty-nine years.” The parties decided that a new agreement will be developed and signed next year, which will ensure the deployment of the Russian military base for another 49 years. Although neither Medvedev nor his Tajik counterpart disclosed any details, sources in the Russian Government say that the military base will again be deployed for free, but Russia will provide support for increasing the capacity of Tajikistan’s military forces.
At the same time, according to the documents signed, Russian border troops will not return to the Tajik-Afghan border. Moreover, the number of Russian border troop advisors currently deployed in Tajikistan will decrease and their status will change from “operational group” to “representative mission”.
The results of the negotiations between Medvedev and Rahmon were perceived negatively by local experts and politicians. Some local experts believe that many important issues were left unresolved, particularly in economic cooperation, and that this will further impede the development of bilateral relations. Furthermore, a group of over fifty Tajik intellectuals and journalists published a statement where they ask the government not to sign any agreements related to military bases with Russia without a plebiscite.
By contrast, the outcome of Ahmadinejad’s visit are perceived in Tajikistan as a successful step in developing mutually beneficial relations. During the visit, the Iranian President and his Tajik counterpart officially opened the Sangtuda-2 hydropower station which Iran has constructed on the Vakhsh River of Tajikistan. Ahmadinejad also announced that Iran is going to construct another hydropower station in Tajikistan on the Zerafshan River. In his statement, Ahmadinejad termed Tajikistan and Iran “a part of one whole,” emphasizing that the construction of hydropower stations is just one aspect of cooperation between the two countries, which have a “single history, culture, tradition and religion.”
The high level meetings are viewed by many as signaling increasing competition between Russia and Iran for influence in the Central Asian region and Tajikistan in particular. As an outcome of Medvedev’s and Ahmadinejad’s consecutive visits to Dushanbe, it seems that Iran scored an advantage despite Russia’s remaining military presence in Tajikistan. i-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA; mso-bidi-font-style:italic'>administrative resources are used during the upcoming elections.