On June 22, President Obama announced a withdrawal of 33,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by 2012. According to the U.S./NATO strategy, these governments should withdraw all their forces by 2014. However, although NATO plans no bases in Afghanistan, the U.S. is negotiating with Kabul to preserve some unspecified bases and is conducting an extensive program of military construction of facilities for Central Asian militaries. Central Asia is becoming more important as a supply route as U.S. ties to Pakistan deteriorate. These linked developments have generated reactions from many if not all of the interested parties to the conflict, which reveal future perceptions of security trends in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

BACKGROUND: A U.S. government poll seems to indicate some measure of confidence among Afghans that they can handle security as the U.S. withdraws. But other reactions are more skeptical. The Indian government, which has made a huge investment in Afghanistan and thus aroused enormous Pakistani suspicions, is clearly alarmed at the prospect of a U.S./NATO withdrawal. Lacking direct access to Afghanistan, India will likely face a more intense challenge form the Taliban and its Pakistani-based supporters, including terrorist groups that strike directly at India. In Pakistan itself, secular political actors, fearing even more Islamization of politics and encroachment by the Islamist elements, are likewise distressed by this announcement.

Central Asian governments, though unwilling to discuss their alarm publicly, clearly fear a Taliban takeover and do not have much confidence in the Karzai regime or the Afghan army to defend Afghanistan. Indeed, many local analysts view a victory or stabilization in Afghanistan as a necessary precondition for the ongoing security of Central Asia. Many of these governments as well as some commentators believe that the indigenous terrorist threats are growing or have been growing since 2008-09 and view a Taliban victory in Afghanistan as providing the basis for the spiritual and material encouragement of these groups that threaten their own domestic security. Fully grasping the neo-imperial motives behind Russian ambitions to create more military bases and postings for its troops there, they are reluctant to give Moscow that access but fear being left with no other choice. This particularly applies to Tajikistan. Moreover, given the importance of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to their economic well-being, they certainly are reluctant to see it fade away. In view of the historic absence of regional integration among these governments, it would also probably be quixotic to expect them to produce a large-scale, coherent military alternative force to replace the US/NATO forces. Thus they fear that they might be abandoned to Moscow if not Beijing or left on their own to face what they believe to be a mounting terrorist threat.

Moscow’s reaction is also quite predictable. Believing fully in Washington’s ulterior motives as evinced by this program of military construction and an enhanced regional diplomatic profile, Moscow is not unhappy to see the troops leave. But it too harbors no confidence in what comes next as its special envoy to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov recently commented that the situation there deteriorates from day to day. It fears an advance of the Taliban, an explosion of terrorism in both Central Asia and the North Caucasus and a concomitant explosion of the drug trade that is already killing 30,000 young Russians annually. Meanwhile it is seeking more bases and lodgments for its troops in Central Asia under the CSTO’s command auspices, but constantly reiterates that it has no desire to return to Afghanistan. Given the past record of the Russian military, there is good reason to wonder if the Russian and indigenous troops the CSTO might bring to the fray are really capable of defending Central Asia against a Taliban-like threat.

IMPLICATIONS: These reactions have at least two common themes that merit our attention. First of all, they all betray a lack of confidence in the ability of the Karzai government and the Afghan army to stabilize the country, bring about improved and legitimate governance, defend against the Taliban, and curtail the trade in narcotics. The Taliban and the reconstituted Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have already conducted cross-border raids into Tajikistan. Many observers also argue strongly that the U.S. has failed to succeed at what used to be called nation building and it is doubtful whether the U.S. and NATO have succeeded in what the Soviets used to call state building. In the Northern Panjshir province bordering Tajikistan, the provincial security commander General Mohammad Qasim Jangalbagh calls for a huge force because the surrounding provinces are insecure. This suggests that U.S. reports about the progress being made by the Afghan army may not in fact be accurate and that the optimistic premise of the U.S. withdrawal, that the Afghan Army can defend the country by itself, is unfounded.

Beyond this visible pessimism and lack of confidence in the capacity of Afghan authorities to take control of the situation as the U.S. leaves, is a second common denominator. Essentially, all these actors maintain that whether or not they have invested heavily in Afghanistan’s stabilization, they do not possess sufficient resources or will to make the truly enormous investments needed to bring about stability in the country by their own efforts. Accordingly, we see a continuation of the fact that while promises of aid have been made dating back to the Bonn conference of 2001, they have not been fulfilled either due to a lack of will by various governments or their own paucity of resources, and that this situation is worsening. Just as NATO forces are increasingly looking for the exit, many states with important, even vital interests in Afghanistan are only willing to earmark limited quantities of assistance to it, and are probably skeptical that aid can be put to maximum benefit.

If these pessimistic reactions and judgments are well-founded, then Afghanistan and Central Asia face troubling and dangerous prospects. The fear of a vacuum or Taliban victory will lead external governments either to make accommodations with the Taliban or to improve their own position in Afghanistan. Indeed, these are not mutually exclusive options. But they restore much of the past tradition making Afghanistan the football of external actors. Indeed, the ISI is and remains the Taliban’s sponsor as a sign of this continuing tradition.

A second outcome is that as the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan, its position in Central Asia is likely to erode commensurately, especially as its own fiscal woes demand attention. That trend in turn opens for increased foreign maneuvering to subordinate the region, most likely to Moscow or Beijing. But other actors like India, Pakistan, and Iran may well invigorate their efforts to attain strategic niches of influence, thus continuing or extending the new great game, in distinction to the Anglo-Russian rivalry of past centuries. It remains difficult to see viable prospects for successful Central Asian regional integration given the record of the last twenty years and the likely conditions as this withdrawal occurs. If anything, the existing competition for influence in Central Asia is likely to accelerate and become more localized as external actors like the U.S. and NATO, and possibly the EU, withdraw due to a lack of resources and compelling strategic interest.

CONCLUSIONS: None of this is in the interests of Central Asian states and they know it. But it remains to be seen how much they can do to escape this potential fate, especially if their pessimism about Afghanistan turns out to be justified. Conversely, if the Karzai regime can indeed stabilize Afghanistan, this could generate trends that may run counter to a pessimistic scenario and breed a virtuous circle. However, the international community must then finally step up to its responsibilities and help Afghanistan help itself. Given the past record of indifference, this is admittedly asking a great deal. But as we have also seen in the past, failure to accept this responsibility can only add to the costs in lives and treasure not only in Afghanistan and Central Asia but also far beyond their borders.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.