After months of feuding the two rival factions within Chechnya’s rebel organisation have been reconciled. Doku Umarov, the disputed leader of the Caucasus Emirate organisation, has somehow prevailed upon his opponents in the Chechen branch of the organisation to once again recognize his legitimacy as Emir. Following some deft political manoeuvring, Umarov has rescued his dwindling legitimacy. But it remains to be seen if there is a hidden price for Umarov to pay for this new affectation of political unity within the rebel ranks, and in that case, for how long Umarov will remain the leader of the rebel organization.
BACKGROUND: On July 23 the Kavkazcenter.com website announced that the self-styled Emir of the Caucasus Emirate, Doku Umarov, had been reconciled with a group of estranged Chechen field commanders who withdrew their oath of loyalty to him in late 2010. This reconciliation was reportedly achieved at a recent meeting of the Caucasus Emirate’s Supreme Sharia Court. Video pictures accompanying the report showed Umarov flanked by the current chairman of the Sharia Court, Ali Abu-Muhammed al-Dagestani, and the leader of the group of dissident Chechen field commanders, Hussein Gakayev.
Before going any further, a brief explanation of the origins of this controversy is in order. From late 2007 Gakayev and several other leading field commanders based in Chechnya began to experience misgivings with Umarov’s style of leadership, which they deemed to be excessively autocratic. Umarov’s decision to announce the establishment of a Caucasus Emirate in October 2007, for example, was apparently arrived at without any consultation with senior field commanders in Chechnya. Matters did not come to a head until late 2010, however, when Umarov seemingly reneged on an agreement to relinquish his position as Emir of the Caucasus Emirate. This volte-face led to Gakayev and several likeminded colleagues, including well-known field commanders such as Muhanned and Aslanbek Vadalov, to rescind their oath of allegiance to Umarov. The resulting split was acrimonious, with Umarov and his supporters blaming Muhanned, a fighter of non-Chechen origin, for damaging morale in the rebel ranks and Gakayev, Vadalov and their associates in turn accusing Umarov of provoking the controversy by ignoring the collective will of Chechnya’s rebel organisation.
In the time since the quarrel between Umarov and the dissidents was made public, conditions within the rebel organisation in the Northern Caucasus have changed to a significant degree. The new set of conditions obtaining within the organisation arguably made it easier for Umarov and his opponents to arrive at some form of compromise.
In March, a Russian airstrike in Ingushetia resulted in the death of Supyan Abdullayev, Umarov’s long-time deputy. Abdullayev was a member of the small cabal of advisors who encouraged Umarov to declare the Caucasus Emirate in 2007 and was therefore a polarizing factor in the standoff between Umarov and the dissident Chechen field commanders. Less than one month later, pro-Russian forces in Chechnya eliminated the Arab field commander Muhanned, or Khalid Yusuf Muhanned al-Emirati. Umarov had blamed Muhanned for inciting the controversy through engaging in seditious and slanderous activity in order to undermine the Caucasus Emirate project.
It is likely that the elimination of these two polarizing influences paved the way toward reconciliation between the two factions.
IMPLICATIONS: One of the video clips of the proceedings at the reconciliatory meeting between Umarov and the dissidents shows Umarov, Gakayev and Vadalov embracing, with all three men admitting to unspecified “mistakes” before the later two re-affirm their oath of loyalty to Umarov. Another clip features Ali Abu-Muhammed al-Dagestani pontificating at length to a large gathering which includes Umarov, Gakayev, Vadalov and ‘Emir Khamzat’ (Aslan Byutukayev), one of the few Chechen field commanders who remained loyal to Umarov during the course of the recent controversy.
It has emerged that the re-unified rebel organisation in Chechnya will be bifurcated into two fronts covering the eastern and western sectors of the republic. Both of these fronts will be under the overall command of Doku Umarov. Responsibility for the eastern theatre rests with Gakayev while the western front is the preserve of Emir Khamzat. This delegation of responsibilities would seem to reflect a new spirit of compromise among senior rebel leaders.
Gakayev and Vadalov are strongest in eastern districts like Gudermes, Kurchaloi and Vedeno. They will therefore be satisfied to cede responsibility for the western sector to Umarov and Byutukayev. Umarov and Byutukayev are natives of south-western Chechnya and the latter has recently bolstered his profile by laying claim to several high-profile attacks – the suicide attack on Moscow’s Domodedevo airport earlier this year, for example – in the name of the Riyad-us Saliheen Martyrs Battalion, which he leads. Umarov’s continued leadership of the Chechen front, and indeed of the Caucasus Emirate, was probably a greater point of contention between the two parties. It is possible that a secret timetable for Umarov’s resignation from one or both of these positions has been agreed upon, though there is no indication if his eventual successor has already been selected.
Despite these recent developments, some important questions remain unanswered. For example, what is the position of another key dissident, Tarhan Gaziyev? Has he also renewed his oath of loyalty to Umarov? Gaziyev did not attend the reconciliatory meeting in July. Possibly this was due solely to logistical considerations, but Gaziyev remains strong in south-western Chechnya and was arguably a more qualified candidate to lead the new western front than Byutukayev. Moreover, will second tier field commanders like Mahran Saidov and Zaurbek Avdorkhanov follow Gakayev’s example by renewing their fealty to Umarov? Like Gaziyev, these two individuals were conspicuous by their absence from the video materials released by Kavkazcenter.
The identity of Byutukayev’s lieutenant, or ‘naib’, when it becomes known in due course, will also be of interest. It is likely Umarov will award this post to someone who supported him throughout the controversy – Said-Emin Dadayev, perhaps. Reportedly the pre-eminent field commander in Umarov’s native Shatoi District, Dadayev has been included by Umarov in a previous rebel shadow government. In contrast to the majority of Chechnya’s field commanders, Dadayev declined to publicly ally himself with Gakayev and Vadalov during the recent dispute.
CONCLUSIONS: The healing of the rift between the rival Chechen factions has come at a timely moment for the rebel organisation in the North Caucasus. The respective organizations in Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria have been dealt a number of heavy blows over the past twelve months by pro-Russian security forces, and while the rebel organisation in Dagestan continues to go from strength to strength, its counterpart in Chechnya appears to have lost momentum in recent years. This state of affairs has not been helped by the quarrel between Umarov and Gakayev, which has naturally had a debilitating impact on the organisation’s operational capacity.
While it would seem that Umarov managed to provoke the leadership controversy in the first instance with his high-handed style of management, it must be acknowledged that he has acted in a politically astute fashion since the breach. Umarov made Muhanned a scapegoat for the controversy, portraying him as an Arab nationalist who was trying to undermine the rebels’ political agenda. Conversely, Umarov eschewed the use of excessively harsh rhetoric against the Chechen dissidents, repeatedly inviting them to renew their oath of loyalty to him. In short, Umarov resisted the temptation to burn all bridges with his opponents and has seemingly reaped the rewards of this far-sighted policy over the past month.
Umarov has clearly emerged victorious from this affair, which is remarkable because initially it seemed as though the controversy would destroy him. He remains the leader of the organization in Chechnya and is still the “Emir of the Caucasus Emirate”. Umarov has also managed to advance the prospects of his closest follower (Byutukayev) and has increased the prestige of his supporters in Dagestan by involving them, however superficially, in the reconciliation process.
Gakayev, Vadalov and their followers, by contrast, appear to have gained nothing by their disobedience. However, the price for their submission may well become apparent in due course and it will be interesting to see if Umarov remains the leader of the organization for very much longer.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree from University College Cork, Ireland.