BALUCHISTAN: PAKISTAN’S OTHER PROBLEM?
Baluchistan is the largest and strategically most important province of Pakistan and will play an important role especially in the country’s economic future. Baloch culture is primarily tribal and its society is dominated by tribal sardars, nawabs and mirs. Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, Baluchistan has seen several phases of violence and insurgency including the most violent in 1974-77. Since 2005, a low level insurgency is fought in the province. One of its unique features is the target killings of mainly Punjabi, but also Muhajir settlers. Regardless of a persistent militant rhetoric, the insurgency has been largely contained in the last few months.
BACKGROUND: Geographically, Baluchistan is the largest province of Pakistan, constituting approximately 43 percent of Pakistan’s territory. At the same time, it is the least populated province, housing 5.1% of Pakistan’s population. Baluch culture is primarily tribal and its society is dominated by tribal sardars, nawabs and mirs (chieftains). Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, Baluchistan has witnessed several phases of violence and insurgency including the most violent in 1974-77. While there were reports of underground activity by the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) since early 2000, the rape of Dr. Shazia Khalid, a company doctor at the Sui Gas plant, on 2 January 2005 can be identified as the event triggering the ongoing wave of violence in Baluchistan, although a number of other factors have also contributed to it over time.
The insurgent activities are focused in Dera Bugti, Kohlu, Jaffarabad and Naseerabad. The main insurgent groups are the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) led by Brahmadagh Bugti, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) headed by Hyarbyar Marri, and the Baluch Liberation Front (BLF) which is the militant wing of the Baluch Student Organization (Azad). Bugti is currently based in Switzerland, whereas Marri resides in London. One of the features of the current unrest in Baluchistan is the targeted killings of mostly Punjabi but also Muhajair settlers, which started after the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006.
Although resentment against Punjabi settlers has existed in the past, they have never previously been targeted to the extent that has been the case in the current insurgency. Nearly 1,200 settler doctors, teachers, professors, barbers, laborers or police officials were killed between 2008 and 2010 and around 100,000 have left Baluchistan. The targeted killings are blamed on Baluch militants, with the BLA reportedly accepting responsibility for most of the deaths. In an interview, Bugti has justified these and other killings, stating that he agreed with an article he had recently read that encouraged the Baluch to conduct more target killings. When questioned about the killing of 20 Baluch policemen in the Naseerabad district and the targeted killing of Punjabi teachers, the BRP chief said he supported the actions of the separatists. However, Azad Baloch of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claims responsibility for the killings of the settlers, stating that they were spying for the intelligence agencies.
IMPLICATIONS: Baluchistan is strategically the most important province of Pakistan and will play a very important role especially in the country’s economic future. It has witnessed another phase of low level insurgency over the last few years. However, the insurgency has largely been contained in the last few months. Consequently, the number of targeted killings has also decreased. According to Muhammad Amir of the Baluchistan Punjabi Ittihad, 10-12 such killings have been reported in as many months, which is significantly lower than the previous year. The chief minister of Baluchistan stated in a newspaper interview that the situation in Baluchistan is gradually improving: “Go around the province, visit different Baluch belts and you will see that the insurgency does not have much support.” A similar view was provided by the speaker of the Baluchistan provincial assembly: “More people die in Karachi each day. When diplomats visit here, they urge us to tell the world more about the realities of Baluchistan, which is more normal than people expect.”
Most Baluch analysts, journalists and politicians are of the opinion that the level of the current insurgency does not even come close to that in the 1970s, as this time, it lacks widespread support. Importantly, the targeted killing of settlers was a sign of weakness, not resolve, on the part of the insurgents: it implied that they were not strong enough to fight the security forces and hence were attacking soft targets. This strategy certainly made headlines, but at the same time negatively affected public opinion in Baluchistan and the country in general. While the insurgency has largely been contained, Baluchistan still faces the threat of sectarian violence. Another important problem is the presence of criminal gangs involved in all types of crimes, including kidnapping and targeted killings. These groups are allegedly backed by influential locals and politicians.
Baluchistan’s provincial authorities have also started implementing the Aghaz-e-Huqooq Baluchistan Package, which promises more than 10,000 new jobs to Baluch youth. According to an official who is part of the team overseeing the implementation of the package, 5,000 federal government vacancies have already been filled up, while the provincial government is in the process of hiring for another 6,000 jobs. Each member of the Baluchistan assembly is allocated PKR 180 million (over US$ 2 million) to be used in different development projects in their respective constituencies. It has been reported that in the next fiscal year, this amount is likely to be increased. It is now up to the people’s representatives in Baluchistan to use these funds to improve living standards in their constituencies. The effects of such development projects are already visible in some regions, as in the Mastung area which is the constituency of Aslam Raisani, the current Chief Minister of Baluchistan, where health and education infrastructure is under steady development.
The Pakistani Army has for some time made a systematic effort to recruit Baluch youth in its various branches and services. It is also providing opportunities for better education to Baluch children by locating talented students and sending them to top schools across the country. The Punjab government has also started a scholarship program for Baluch children. Another important development which is often ignored in the media is that the Pakistani Army, which is responsible for security and takes part in the management of the Chamalang coal mines, has devised a system which earmarks revenues from the coalmine for development projects in the area.
CONCLUSIONS: A number of positive developments have thus taken place in Baluchistan in recent months. While this is a good beginning, much remains to be done. In order to address the roots of Baluchistan’s problem, one must understand why a new violent phase started after 25 years of relative peace. In any ethno-political conflict the power elites play a decisive role, as ethnicity becomes a source of conflict when it is politicized by ethnic entrepreneurs. A closer look at the developments in Baluchistan clearly illustrates this point. With a single exception, the current leadership of the insurgency in Baluchistan, Bugti and Marri, come from families of tribal sardars. A Baluchistani member of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Ayatullah Durrani, raised a point which is at the heart of the problem: while he agreed with most of the Baluch complaints, he asked whether the tribal sardars had ever set up a single educational institution for Baluch children, instead of competing for driving the latest models of Japanese cars. It is high time that the traditional Baluch leadership take steps to improve the situation of the Baluch masses. Baluchistan is facing a number of problems and the only realistic solution to all these problems is that all stakeholders should work together to address them.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Rizwan Zeb is based at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies (CMSS), University of Western Australia. He was previously a Benjamin Meaker visiting Professor of Politics at IAS, University of Bristol and a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution.
