The failure of the Armenian-Azerbaijani summit in Kazan on June 24 to reach a compromise on the principles of settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh showed that the influence of great powers in the South Caucasus region is weakening. The three countries co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia, the U.S. and France, have previously acted as neutral brokers assisting the parties to the conflict in finding a peaceful solution. While their interests in the South Caucasus differ, they have shared a concern to inhibit a destabilization of the region which could lead to resumed hostilities.
The standpoints of the three countries were coordinated through actions and statements by their representatives serving as cochairmen of the Minsk Group. This work has continued since 1998 except for several months in 2008 when the U.S. and France sought to isolate Russia after its war with Georgia. During this 13 year period the mediating activities undertaken by either one of the three co-chairs enjoyed the full support, at least officially, of the other two. The U.S. organized a meeting in Key West in 2001, and France in Rambouillet in 2006. During the last three years, the Russian President Medvedev has taken on a more active mediating role.
In recent years, the co-chairs have become increasingly active in their efforts to reach a breakthrough in settling the conflict. This transition from a neutral role to an active one is largely driven by a common urge to guarantee stability in a region which is, for different reasons, significant for all three countries and for which the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains a major factor of potential destabilization. This line of the co-chair countries can be traced from the Field Assessment Mission of the co-chairmen carried out in the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh on October 7-13, 2010, which produced a statement claiming that the status-quo can no longer be tolerated. The Deauville statement of the three co-chair countries’ Presidents on May 26 repeated this claim and demonstrated their wish to reach real progress in the volatile region. The co-chairs understood that even if some progress was made in Kazan, a final solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh would be years away.
Besides the Deauville statement, different kinds of pressure were exerted on the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. First of all, this entailed an unprecedented media campaign predicting success in Kazan. Before the meeting, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan were invited for talks to Washington and Moscow. Finally, on the day before the meeting, President Obama made separate phone calls to Presidents Sargsyan and Aliyev and urged them to reach some progress in Kazan. French President Sarkozy sent them messages containing the same demand. In addition, the meeting is Kazan was mediated by Russian President Medvedev.
Yet, no progress was achieved during the Kazan meeting, and Armenia and Azerbaijan blame each other for the failure and make conflicting statements.
The region remains in a dangerous deadlock, with renewed warfare as a definite possibility. The positions of the three great powers, which are at the same time permanent members of the UN Security Council, in the region are weakening. In this situation, Armenia is seeking to approach Europe as seen in Serzh Sargsyan’s speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on June 22.
After the failure at the Kazan meeting, the three co-chair countries will likely move to different tactics and use leverages belonging to a separate country, which may prove more effective than joint efforts. Another possibility is an increased engagement by the EU in the region.