Following the sudden passing of Abkhaz de facto President Sergei Bagapsh in May, Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia will hold a snap Presidential election on August 26. This coincides with South Ossetian leader Kokoity serving his last few months in office: unless the South Ossetian constitution is amended, Kokoity will have to step down and allow for elections in November. The outcome of the two elections is unlikely to have a considerable impact on the post-2008 status quo in the region. However – in Abkhazia in particular – the election processes will test the level influence enjoyed by Russia in the two regions and, as such, constitute an important measurement of their independence from Moscow.

BACKGROUND: Abkhazia’s de facto President Sergei Bagapsh was serving his second term in office when he passed away in Moscow on May 29, 2011, following complications after a lung surgery. The 62-year-old politician was first elected in 2004, succeeding the Soviet-minded leader Vladislav Ardzinba. Bagapsh won in that election an important victory against Raoul Khajimba, who was openly supported by Russia. The election resulted in a stand-off between Sukhumi and Moscow, which was resolved by a compromise through which Khajimba was given the post of vice president. Thus, the 2004 election marked an important road mark in Abkhazia’s strive for independence, as it demonstrated the unwillingness by the Abkhaz leadership and people to be directed by Moscow. Since then, however, Russia has gradually managed to reposition itself on Abkhazia’s political scene. Over the years following the 2004 election, a pro-Russian opposition movement, the Forum for Public Union, emerged and established itself as a voice for those critical of Bagapsh’s policies, especially his failure to gain international support for Abkhazia’s independence. Thus, over the last years Bagapsh has faced a difficult task in balancing the interest of the pro-independence camp as well as those more inclined towards association with Russia. Indeed, the late leader managed this task well: in the elections in 2009 Bagapsh secured a second term in office in the elections in 2009 – defeating again Khajimba who heads the Forum movement. Bagapsh, who was married to an ethnic Georgian, also enjoyed support in the minority populated regions, including the Georgian-populated region of Gali in Southern Abkhazia.

The snap election following Bagapsh’s death is scheduled for August 26. From the ruling elite, acting de facto President Alexander Ankvab and Prime Minister Sergei Shamba are expected to run. Both these candidates belonged to the United Abkhazia movement that challenged Ardzinba in the 2004 election. Ankvab was then perhaps the strongest candidate, but was prevented from running due to not having lived in Abkhazia for five years. Instead, Ankvab backed Bagapsh as the movement’s candidate, assuming the role as Prime Minister, and, after the 2009 elections, as Bagapsh’s Vice President. Shamba for his part ran separately for the post of President in both the 2004 and 2009 elections, but failed to secure sufficient support. Nonetheless, Shamba, who prior to becoming Prime Minister served as the region’s Foreign Minister, has a reputation of being a strong diplomat and has long been Abkhazia’s spokesperson at the international level. From the opposition, Raoul Khajimba and the local businessman Beslan Butba are likely candidates.

Meanwhile, in South Ossetia, de facto President Eduard Kokoity is also serving his second, and, according to the South Ossetian constitution, last term in office. Kokoity, a 47-year-old former Soviet wrestling champion, has been in power in Tskhinvali since 2001 when, according to credible sources, the Russian leadership called him back from Moscow to South Ossetia to run against then-leader Lyudvig Chibirov. Since then, Kokoity has remained loyal to Moscow, but in recent years Russia’s support for has appeared to be fading. Elections in South Ossetia are scheduled for November, although there are speculations as to whether Kokoity will try to postpone the elections to achieve constitutional amendments to allow him to run for a third term. However, the South Ossetian Supreme Court recently ruled out such a possibility, which led a group of Kokoity’s supporters to storm the South Ossetian parliament in protest. While it remains to be seen whether Kokoity will attempt to cling on to power, the recent controversies in South Ossetia proves that the South Ossetian leader no longer enjoys unconditional domestic support. 

IMPLICATIONS: Bagapsh’s death, and the potential succession of power in South Ossetia, constitutes the first true test of the political climate in the two regions after the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. With regard to Abkhazia, when Sukhumi held its 2009 election, the public sentiments in the region were still euphoric over Russia’s recognition of the region’s independence. The post-2008 period also saw a rapid influx of Russian economic and military aid to Abkhazia, which allowed for ambitious modernization projects in the region’s capital and northern parts. However, such developments in Abkhazia soon showed their downside. While the novelty of Abkhaz tourism brought a wave of Russian citizens to Sukhumi and the Gagra regions in 2009, 2010 saw a significant decrease in tourism to Abkhazia. Poor service and over-pricing appeared to outweigh the curiosity factor involved in travelling to the region. Moreover, a row over property rights in 2010 suggested that Russia’s increasing presence in the region is not entirely a blessing for the Abkhazian leadership, which maintains that it enjoys an independent standing from Moscow. However, the willingness of the Abkhaz leadership to challenge Moscow’s influence in any determined way remains doubtful.

Thus, the upcoming election in Abkhazia is important, as it will measure both the public sentiments vis-à-vis Moscow after the 2008 events, as well as the level of influence that Russia wields over Abkhaz politics. At the same time, Russia is aware of this fact and may thus refrain from any obvious interference in the election process. Influential Russian Member of Parliament Konstantin Zatulin recently stated that “I think Russia can afford not to involve in Abkhazia's elections”, and “it is obvious that the elections will not damage Russian interests”. Indeed, he is prone to be right. None of the expected candidates are likely to embark on a policy path much different from the present, especially not regarding relations with Tbilisi. It instead remains to be seen how the next Abkhaz leader will tackle the task of balancing Abkhazia’s strive for independence on the one hand, and the region’s relations with Moscow on the other. Indeed, whoever will replace Bagapsh has big boots to fill in this regard.

The case of South Ossetia is in many ways different from Abkhazia. While Sukhumi has an articulated desire for independence, the Tskhinvali authorities, which in part are the result of direct secondments by Moscow, have been far more ambivalent regarding the region’s future status. Indeed, Kokoity has made statements both confirming and denying the region’s ambitions to achieve independence as opposed to integration with Russia. Overall, there is little doubt that South Ossetia’s policy path is largely dictated by the Kremlin. For this reason, the South Ossetian public is likely to have little say regarding the choice of its next leader. However, just like in Abkhazia, the circumstances surrounding the potential election in Tskhinvali will inevitably prove a point with regard to the standing of the region.

CONCLUSIONS: While the upcoming elections in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are unlikely to challenge the post-2008 deadlock in the region, the next few months will be telling in that they will indicate the level of Russian influence over and interference in the political processes in the two regions three years after the 2008 events. This is particularly important with regard to Abkhazia, where the issue of the leadership’s dependence on Russia is less clear-cut than in South Ossetia. Tbilisi in particular is likely to watch the developments closely, as any signs of fraud or interference by Russia will serve to strengthen the Georgian government’s argument that Moscow is directing the political scene in Georgia’s breakaway regions. The West has also reason to watch closely, as the upcoming developments – in Abkhazia especially – may provide momentum for increased involvement. This opportunity was overlooked in relation to the 2004 election in Abkhazia, which did little to prevent the region from becoming increasingly dependent on Russia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Johanna Popjanevski is Deputy Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, and author of  International Law and the Post-2008 Status Quo in Georgia: Implications for Western Policies [1], (Silk Road Paper, May 2011).