THE DANGER OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN KYRGYZSTAN
Nationalist feelings have been on the rise in Kyrgyzstan since the ethnic conflict in June 2010. Amid visible and hidden tensions among the ethnic majority and ethnic minorities, the Kyrgyz government has promised to release a special document that would outline a plan on building inter-ethnic peace. This document, scheduled to appear in mid-March, is, however, unlikely to tackle the often hidden ethno-nationalism among ruling political elites. A more complex approach is necessary that would emphasize the importance of citizenship ahead of ethnic identity and openly challenge ethno-nationalist feelings. The country’s political leadership must realize that only a civic model of nation-building will allow for a parliamentary system to strengthen in Kyrgyzstan.
BACKGROUND: It feels like déjà-vu all over again. Nearly twenty years ago, when Kyrgyzstan gained independence in 1991, its citizens faced a nation-building dilemma. Should they build a country in which only the ethnic majority would enjoy preeminence, or should they create a state in which all citizens would have equal rights irrespective of their ethnic belonging? After two decades of wavering between these alternatives, two revolutions and two bloody inter-ethnic conflicts, Kyrgyz citizens are grappling with the same dilemma again. As they vacillate between these two contradictory paths, they risk repeating the mistakes of the past.
In the early 1990s, Kyrgyz citizens lacked a clear understanding of who belonged to their new state. In August 1991, ethnic Kyrgyz barely made up a majority with only 52 percent of the population. Other ethnic groups, including Russians and Uzbeks, demanded more political representation in the government. Eager to quell ethnic tensions, the first president, Askar Akaev, sought to promote a civic-based idea of Kyrgyzstan being a “common home” for all groups. The president also built informal ties with leaders of ethnic minority groups through the People's Assembly, a quasi-governmental structure. Akayev’s liberal policies allowed different groups to establish informal spheres of influence in various economic and civil service sectors.
Having seized power in March 2005, Kyrgyzstan’s second president Kurmanbek Bakiyev undid many of Akayev's policies that aimed at fostering harmonious inter-ethnic relations. Under Bakiyev, the role of the People's Assembly declined, and the informal division of economic and social sectors was disrupted. Instead, Bakiyev relied on the security apparatus, led by his brother Janysh, to suppress ethnic minorities. Bakiyev's downfall opened a floodgate of pent-up ethnic tension created by years of biased government polices and ushered in the inter-ethnic clashes of June 2010.
The June events devastated Kyrgyzstan in many ways, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of citizens, the destruction of property, the explosion of ethnic nationalism and the mass emigration of its citizens. But in the eyes of some citizens, both ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, the events clarified the actual state of ethnic majority-minority relations. In keeping with this view, the June events resolved the perennial identity dilemma because they firmly established the preeminence of the ethnic Kyrgyz in the political and economic spheres. As one Osh resident put it, “the Kyrgyz won, the Uzbeks lost; victors dictate the rules of the game and losers must accept them.” There will be fewer conflicts now that the matter is clarified, some residents say.
IMPLICATIONS: Not all citizens, however, accept this view of the post-conflict situation. Some moderates claim that the preeminence of one ethnic group over others will in fact inevitably lead to more confrontations in the future. The moderates’ calls for equal treatment of all citizens, however, are largely overshadowed by the rising influence of nationalists. The nationalists are now seeking to undermine moderates by labeling them as unpatriotic provocateurs.
Among the few politicians with moderate ideas in Kyrgyzstan, President Roza Otunbayeva seems able to separate citizenship from ethnicity. In her speeches following the conflict in Osh, the president tried to highlight the importance of interethnic tolerance and the significance of civic identity. In late 2010, Otunbayeva said that new guidelines for strengthening inter-ethnic peace will be developed in mid-March 2011. As the months passed, however, Otunbayeva and the rest of the political leadership proved reluctant to address the question of ethnicity and citizenship directly.
Instead, during her recent visits to Naryn and Talas, the president allowed herself to be surrounded by ethnic symbols – women dressed in traditional Kyrgyz gowns and artifacts made by local artisans. By surrounding herself with Kyrgyz ethnic symbols but without stressing the importance of equal citizenship, the president indivertibly indicated her support for the idea that ethnic Kyrgyz are the country’s core group. A more sensitive post-conflict strategy would either distance public officials from ethnocentric symbols or encourage them to pay equal attention to attributes of all ethnic groups living in Kyrgyzstan.
The Kyrgyz government has been reluctant to address the so-called nationalities question in a more decisive way. As one observer put it, rather than deal with the legacy of the June violence impartially and resolutely, the government’s Soviet-style instinct has been to try and sweep the unpleasant events under the rug and put forward a mantra of “friendship of the peoples”. Troublingly, rather than condemning rising nationalist sentiments in a consistent manner, the majority of Kyrgyz leaders have ostensibly accepted the status-quo which benefits the ethnic majority. This may in part be due to the fear of being toppled by powerful nationalist groups; and in part because some nationalistic figures now control government policy. It may also be that government officials underestimate the importance of resolving the nationalities question. Finally, some state officials seem to be incapable of separating the concept of citizenship from ethnic identity. Some officials privately argue that ethnic Kyrgyz should be treated as the country’s “core” and somewhat privileged group.
Regardless of their motives, the Kyrgyz government’s passive approach to the idea of citizenship is dangerous for a number of reasons. First, it undermines the newly adopted parliamentary system. The new system can potentially encourage the participation of ethnic minorities. However, it could also become a source of tensions should nationalist feelings prevail. In a worst case scenario, the parliamentary system may fail altogether if ethnic and other social minorities are not politically represented. Excluded from political institutions, citizens representing ethnic minorities risk join banned religious and criminal groups. Ethnic Uzbeks already predominate in Hizb-ut-Tahrir, according to government reports. Second, the rise in nationalism is causing a massive outflow of skilled citizens, thus undermining Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic diversity and its ability to develop in a robust manner. Finally, the usurpation of politics by nationalist groups is worsening Kyrgyzstan’s relations with regional partners. Already, Russia is livid over an initiative by Kyrgyz nationalists to replace Russian town names with Kyrgyz ones.
If it wants to avoid the pitfalls associated with the current status quo, the Kyrgyz government needs to unequivocally commit itself to the civic model of nation-building. To make this policy genuinely effective, authorities should understand the reasons why the idea of a multi-ethnic state was a failure under the two previous presidents. First, the policy of multi-ethnic harmony remained largely a declarative one, lacking genuine government backing and administrative resources behind it. The main rationale behind the policy was to enlist the support of ethnic minorities for the presidents during elections and to improve the government’s international image. Second, the policy was imposed from above and lacked genuine backing at the level of ordinary residents. Many ethnic Kyrgyz resented the policy because they felt it infringed on their rights as the titular ethnic nationality. A large number of ethnic minority representatives found the policy distasteful because they felt manipulated by the incumbent regimes.
CONCLUSIONS: Kyrgyzstan again finds itself at a crossroads. The violent events of 2010 have taken their toll, but they also provide a window of opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the past and settle on a constructive path. If Kyrgyz citizens truly want democratic governance to succeed, they and their leaders must treat ethnic and cultural diversity as a unifying force and not as a political manipulation tool. They should openly challenge nationalist sentiments, emphasize the rights of citizens irrespective of their ethnicity, foster an honest and open debate on the June events, and engage in genuine reconciliation. If Kyrgyz citizens succeed in accomplishing these goals, Kyrgyzstan can become a model for stability and integration of ethnic groups for Central Asia and CIS. If they fail, Kyrgyzstanis will set themselves again on the path to a violent revolution and deadly inter-ethnic conflict.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Alisher Khamidov is a PhD Candidate at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Erica Marat is a Nonresident Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.
