DAGESTAN’S GOVERNMENT SUGGESTS VOLUNTEER MILITIAS TO COUNTER LOCAL INSURGENCY
The situation in Dagestan is becoming increasingly grim. Russia’s leadership has started to complain about President Magomedsalam Magomedov’s failure to jump-start the republic’s economy; meanwhile, Magomedov blames local security services for their failure to provide a favourable investment climate by stabilizing the security situation in Dagestan. Amid this latest round of finger-pointing, Magomedov has set forth a controversial proposal that would see volunteer militias, comprised of native Dagestanis, tasked with tackling the rebel organization in the republic. However, the social conditions in Dagestan and the Kremlin’s limited patience with Magomedov suggest such a replication of Kadyrov’s counter-terrorism tactics will be difficult to implement.
BACKGROUND: During a meeting with Alexander Khloponin in early November, Dmitri Medvedev exhorted his representative to the North Caucasus Federal District (SKFO) to assess “how work is going and [how] the individual leaders of territorial entities are handling their responsibilities”. Any regional leader not living up to his responsibilities “should not remain in his post”, Medvedev declared. At the same meeting Medvedev pointedly criticised Dagestan’s leadership for the slow pace of economic development in the republic. “You are working slowly; everything should be carried out more actively”, the Russian president complained.
Medvedev is growing increasingly frustrated with President Magomedsalam Magomedov’s failure to curb the rebel insurgency in Dagestan and his consequent inability to stimulate economic growth. Medvedev’s annoyance has been reflected in a series of harsh remarks he has directed against both Khloponin and Magomedov, both of whom have yet to see out a full year in their respective portfolios.
Magomedov, who was appointed president of Dagestan by Medvedev in February, has suffered a fraught first ten months in office. His plan to stimulate economic growth in Dagestan through attracting inward investment has been thwarted by the increasingly brazen activities of Dagestan’s insurgent movement. The campaign of violence organized by this constituency has discouraged potential investors from committing to Dagestan’s economy. Magomedov has repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the law enforcement agencies’ inability to curtail the activities of the rebel movement.
Even as he struggles to contend with this unfavorable state of affairs, it has become clear that Magomedov does not enjoy the full confidence of the Russian president. It is no secret that Medvedev, and other senior members of the presidential administration, originally intended to appoint Magomed Abdullayev, a former university classmate of the Russian president, as leader of Dagestan. Ultimately, Abdullayev’s bid for the presidency was derailed by his lack of administrative experience. While his admiration for Abdullayev’s leadership qualities remains undiminished, Medvedev concluded at length that Abdullayev would benefit from an apprenticeship as chairman of Dagestan’s government.
Despite the fact that he was obviously not President Medvedev’s first choice for the post, and despite the fact that his political authority is far more limited than the title of his job would suggest, Magomedov has managed to accrue some notable political achievements during his ten months in office. He has steered the country through two rounds of potentially destabilizing municipal elections, in March and in October of this year. He has also managed to re-organize Dagestan’s political system without upsetting the region’s delicate ethnic balance.
IMPLICATIONS: These achievements have been overshadowed by the activities of Dagestan’s rebel movement. Magomedov’s response to this increasingly volatile situation, other than upbraiding his interior ministry, has been to propose the establishment of pro-government, volunteer militias in Dagestan. These militias would be armed by the government in Makhachkala and would take the form of battalions assigned to the republic’s most troublesome localities.
Each battalion (two battalions are currently envisaged) would be tasked with taking the fight to militants operating within its own jurisdiction. The government official most closely associated with this initiative is First Deputy Prime Minister Rizwan Kurbanov. “We expect the local personnel to be more effective because, unlike the federal troops, they know all the roads in the mountains and can tell the difference between traditional Islam believers and the extremists even by their appearance,” Kurbanov explained. Approval for this initiative has already been sought and received from the Kremlin. Dagestan’s leadership hopes that this initiative, in tandem with a selective amnesty for militants and a government purchase scheme for illegally-held firearms, will help to slow the insurgency’s momentum.
Like the four ethno-battalions presently operating in Chechnya, the Dagestani battalions will function under the auspicies of Russia’s Interior Ministry. In reality, however, it is clear that Magomedov and Kurbanov expect these battalions to report directly to them. The Magomedov-Kurbanov initiative reveals a great deal about the respective mindsets of the Dagestani authorities and their counterparts in Moscow at this juncture. Firstly, the initiative suggests that Magomedov, who has routinely expressed his dissatisfaction with the performance of local law enforcement agencies, has concluded that he cannot rely upon Dagestan’s Interior Ministry to prosecute an effective counter-insurgency campaign against the rebel organization. Secondly, the Kremlin’s acquiescence to this plan suggests that Russian decision makers are ready to deploy the same counter-insurgency strategy in Dagestan as has been used in neighboring Chechnya over the past ten years.
The strategy in Chechnya has involved four ethno-battalions, each comprised almost entirely of ethnic Chechens, undertaking counter-insurgency operations against their rebellious countrymen with assistance from the Russian military and Russian Special Forces. At a micro level, this strategy also involved members of these battalions harassing family members of suspected militants. In dozens of instances, people have been illegally abducted and imprisoned by militiamen with the goal of increasing the psychological pressure on their wayward relative(s) to surrender to the authorities. Are these the rules of engagement Magomedov and Kurbanov propose for their new paramilitary force? Both men have been noticeably coy regarding the exact functions these new battalions will be expected to perform. It is also unclear how this initiative will be reconciled with the poly-ethnic nature of society in Dagestan. For example, will one battalion be composed exclusively of ethnic Kumyks, another of ethnic Dargins, a third of ethnic Laks, etc.? Or will they instead be mixed battalions with members of all, or most, ethnic groups represented? Should these battalions be mono-ethnic in composition, will they be expected to operate in localities where another ethnic group is predominant? These questions have not yet been answered by Magomedov and Kurbanov.
CONCLUSIONS: It is easy to understand why Magomedov, Kurbanov and their superiors in Moscow might view the counter-insurgency campaign carried out in Chechnya over the past decade as an example of how the rebel movement in Dagestan ought to be dealt with. Chechnya is more stable today than it has been at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the counter-insurgency strategy in Chechnya, at least since 2004, has been dependent on Ramzan Kadyrov, a flamboyant caudillo-style leader who has been willing and able to employ the most brutal tactics against Chechnya’s rebel constituency. Kadyrov has been termed the “indigenous key to success” in the Kremlin’s counter-insurgency campaign in Chechnya. Kurbanov, it should be noted, displays a photograph of Kadyrov prominently in his office and is a self-professed admirer of the counter-insurgency measures undertaken by Kadyrov in Chechnya. While Kurbanov admires Kadyrov personally, the prevailing social conditions in Dagestan militate against the successful replication of Kadyrov’s counter-insurgency campaign there. It is also uncertain how much more time the Kremlin is willing to give Magomedov and Kurbanov to redeem the security situation in the republic.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree from University College York, Ireland.
