On the morning of October 19, as Russia’s Minister of Internal Affairs was preparing to meet Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov at the Parliament building in the Chechen capital of Grozny, militants stormed the Parliament compound with assault rifles, RPGs, and suicide vests in an attack that left six killed and seventeen others wounded. This bold assault on one of the region’s most significant government institutions was the product of a developing schism within the region’s insurgency, which, rather than weakening the insurgent movement, foreshadows a new challenge for a government that appears to have few ideas for addressing the longstanding problem of violence in the North Caucasus.
BACKGROUND: The principle militant organization carrying out attacks in the North Caucasus and other parts of Russia is the Caucasus Emirate, a movement with the stated goal of creating an independent Islamic state covering the entire North Caucasus. Developments in the insurgency’s internal politics threaten a new outbreak of violence throughout the region. Doku Umarov has led the Caucasus Emirate movement since 2007, but in recent months one of his former subordinates, Khusein Gakayev, has challenged his authority. The intra-militant dispute has played out through the release of video statements and high profile attacks against civilian and government targets.
As Umarov and Gakayev battle for control of the Caucasus Emirate, it is necessary to assess Russia’s recent attempts to quell violence across the North Caucasus. In 2007, then-President Vladimir Putin appointed Ramzan Kadyrov as President of Chechnya. Kadyrov, himself a former militant and son of the assassinated former President, has used brutal tactics to suppress violence in Chechnya. In response, Russian federal authorities have awarded Kadyrov with huge amounts of financial support that allowed him to largely rebuild the war-torn capital and embark on prestige projects, such as the construction of Europe’s largest mosque.
Despite the Kremlin’s official announcement in April 2009 that it ended ‘counter-terrorist operations’ in Chechnya, violence continues to occur throughout the North Caucasus. Widespread unemployment and distrust of Russian rule have made the region a fertile ground for recruiting insurgents, particularly in the regions of Ingushetia, Dagestan and Karbardino-Balkariya, where violence has increased rapidly over the past two years. More recently, the Kremlin has tried a new, region-wide approach intended to attack a root cause of the insurgency by addressing the lack of economic development that has left the unemployment rates in some regions extremely high – over 50 percent in Ingushetia, and over 35 percent in Chechnya.
The new approach included the creation of the North Caucasian Federal District, which was carved out of the Southern Federal District in January 2010. The new political entity allowed federal officials to implement a region-wide policy for addressing endemic socio-economic problems. Toward this goal, Medvedev appointed Aleksandr Khloponin as the region’s first Presidential Envoy, thus giving him the task of turning around the dismal economic situation and thereby undercutting the militant movement. Khloponin is not a strongman in the Kadyrov mold, but rather a politician and businessman from Krasnoyarsk Kray. Khloponin, however, has failed to produce tangible results, as the region’s economy continues to struggle and the rate of violence remains high. In July, Khloponin released a detailed long-term plan for the socio-economic development of the region through 2025, but the Kremlin seems to lack the necessary patience for the region to reap any of the potential long-term benefits. Officials are well aware that with the upcoming 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, a highly visible insurgency in the region would be an embarrassment for Russia on the global stage. In November, Medvedev used a public meeting with Khloponin to express his displeasure and threaten changes to the region’s leadership.
IMPLICATIONS: The divide within the Caucasus Emirate began after a bizarre episode in which Umarov released and then quickly retracted an internet video announcing his retirement. Subsequently, several of his highest-ranking lieutenants, including Khusein Gakayev, have renounced their allegiance to Umarov. The string of recent high-profile attacks indicates that Gakayev and Umarov are competing to show off their capabilities, inspire potential recruits and acquire funding. On August 29, militants stormed Kadyrov’s birthplace and stronghold in the village of Tsenteroy, an audacious attack that killed as many as 15 members of Kadyrov’s private security force and for which Gakayev took credit. Less than two weeks later, a suicide bomber attacked a busy market in central Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia-Alania, killing 19 civilians and wounding over 200. An Ingush militant leader under Umarov’s command claimed responsibility for the attack. Most recently, the October 19 attack on the Chechen Parliament – one of the most heavily secured sites in the entire region – was attributed by security services to Gakayev, suggesting that he has one-upped Umarov.
Moreover, the split between Umarov and Gakayev is not only a contest for personal power; it also represents a struggle over the ideological foundation of the insurgency in the North Caucasus. During his time as the leader of the Caucasus Emirate, Umarov has aligned the militancy with the global jihad movement and has sought to establish a regional Emirate governed by Islamic law. His tactics for achieving his political goals involve attacks against civilians as evidenced by the September market bombing in Vladikavkaz. Gakayev, on the other hand, seems to be following a more nationalist path that mirrors the goals of his most prominent supporter, Akhmad Zakayev, the exiled leader of Chechnya’s separatist government. It is also important to note that the attacks attributed to Gakayev have not targeted civilians, but symbols of Kadyrov’s strength in Chechnya (Tsenteroy and Chechnya’s Parliament). Recent events show that the Caucasus Emirate is split in terms of leadership, ideology and tactics, but the schism is certainly not a source of weakness.
It is also apparent that the Russian government has few options available for quelling the violence. The Kadyrov model, which stresses heavy handed, often violent, local control, cannot be easily exported to neighboring provinces because it requires a strong personality with a pre-established base of support. In addition, the recent attacks in Tsenteroy and against Chechnya’s Parliament building have shown that the Kadyrov approach cannot effectively neutralize threats and could in fact be creating more militants. The Khloponin model, which focuses on socio-economic development throughout the region, has the potential to establish long-term stability in the region. However, it does not appear that the Kremlin has the political will to patiently pursue this type of approach, especially with the Olympics quickly approaching.
Daily low scale attacks punctuated by occasional high profile assault will likely remain the status quo throughout the North Caucasus. Russia will likely continue to launch counter-terrorism operations as it has for years, but there is a dearth of new policy options. However, one possible strategy for the Russian government is, in fact, an old approach. Recently, Russian officials at the federal and provincial level have been quick to blame Gakayev and his nationalist faction for attacks and to note that Umarov is shrinking in terms of capabilities and influence. During the Second Chechen War, Russian officials successfully co-opted former nationalist militants, Ramzan Kadyrov and his father, to govern Chechnya. The current fight amongst nationalist and religious extremists could provide Russian officials with a narrow opportunity to elevate and eventually co-opt nationalists. A related tactic may be implemented across the North Caucasus in the near future. In October, Nezavisimaya Gazeta noted that the Russian army is considering the deployment of mono-ethnic divisions across the North Caucasus. The effort echoes the creation of all-Chechen ‘Vostok’ and ‘Zapad’ divisions during the Second Chechen War. However, it is uncertain whether Russia will launch a large scale effort to nationalize the fight against militants in the North Caucasus, but it could be one of the few options left at its disposal.
CONCLUSIONS: While the Russian government has always struggled with political challenges and violence in the North Caucasus, the recent split within the Caucasus Emirate presents a set of problems without a clear path forward. Khloponin’s economic program stalled from the start and the Kremlin is expressing doubts and a lack of patience. In addition, Kadyrov’s heavy-handed approach to governance has failed to establish a haven of stability and security. As the Russian government searches for strategies to bring security to the region in advance of the 2014 Olympics, it appears that the only policy options are old ones that have already produced meager results.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Gregory Zalasky is a Senior Analyst and Dylan Myles-Primakoff is a Subject Matter Expert on the Emerging Threats Project at Georgetown University.