CLUELESS IN THE CAUCASUS: THE US RESET POLICY AND THE CAUCASUS

In August-September 2010 Russia announced that it had stationed S-300 missiles in Abkhazia since 2008, thereby admitting that it had deliberately broken the agreement with the EU that ended the Georgian war.  Moreover, this is part of Russia’s larger comprehensive military buildup there that has led to five military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, also in violation of the 2008 accords.  Moscow has also moved decisively to establish itself as the unchallenged gendarme of the Caucasus by extend the lease on the Gyumri military in Armenia while selling Azerbaijan S-300 air defense missiles The important element is the impunity with which Russia has violated its commitments, primarily due to Washington’s failure to react. 

BACKGROUND: The Obama Administration’s reset policy presumes common interests with Moscow in Central Asia – something Kyrgyzstan’s experience should have disproved – and the need for Russian support in Iran and Afghanistan.  Even though the geopolitical rivalry with Moscow continues in Central Asia despite the Administration’s public rhetoric about win-win solutions there, what has struck every Russian observer who has commented on these issues is the passivity, mute response (and these are their terms), etc. of Washington’s responses to Russian encroachments on the Caucasus and Ukraine, and its silence about events in Kyrgyzstan.  Indeed, they unanimously cite their belief and that of the Russian government that Washington has accepted Moscow’s demands for a free hand and sphere of influence in the CIS.

Notwithstanding U.S. public disclaimers to the contrary, those Russian writers are correct.  Official U.S. statements about the reset policy are notable for their silence concerning geopolitical and regional rivalries in Eurasia.  Instead, Administration spokesmen repeat the same bromides that the Bush Administration used about America’s opposition to zero-sum games in Eurasia and reiterate that Washington desires not rivalry but win-win policies where nobody must choose between Moscow and Washington.  Thus the State Department’s Press Briefer, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Ian Kelly, writes that it is in the U.S. interest to engage Russia in a sustained way on issues that are important to it: proliferation, arms control, and Afghanistan, not regional security in Eurasia.

From conversations with U.S. officials it is clear that Pentagon officials are at a loss to explain why this is the case.  But this outcome appears to reflect the deliberate policy of prominent officials in the State Department and National Security Council who believe that the importance of the proliferation and terrorist threats that America faces obliges it to make concessions to Russia to elicit its cooperation on Iran and Afghanistan.  These policymakers extol the supposed concessions that Russia has made to the U.S. in Iran, e.g. supporting sanctions, and Afghanistan, but overlook that a U.S. victory in Afghanistan is in Russia’s interest whatever we do and that the sanctions it supports in Iran do not suffice to stop Iran from building nuclear weapons.   Indeed, Moscow has now returned  to making energy deals with Iran and opening the Bushehr nuclear power station. 

These policymakers apparently also believe that small Eurasian states are troublemakers that cause problems to the United States in its quest to resolve those big issues with Russia and that in any case these states are in Russia’s “backyard” and that Russia is the region’s hegemon.  Thus our policy equates to the notion of big states solving big problems together and not letting “small problems” and “small states” clutter the agenda with their problems.  Therefore the U.S. may implicitly concede these small states and problems or a leading role in them to Russia, especially as Russia appears to be embarking on a new policy premised on cooperation with the U.S. and Europe.   State Department officials openly say that the U.S. has no interest in Azerbaijan other than overflights to Afghanistan, and that energy is Europe’s issue, not ours, an incredible renunciation of fundamental longstanding principles of U.S. strategy.

IMPLICATIONS: Consequently, even though it is not admitted, the Administration has accepted Russia’s continuing pressure on Georgia and refuses to rearm it with defensive weapons despite Moscow’s violations of the 2008 accords and large-scale regional military buildup.  In addition, Washington is still encouraging the training of Georgian forces for service in Afghanistan-type wars, not defense of the homeland, despite the constant pressure and Russian threats like constant Russian provocations over the new de facto border it created with Georgia by declaring Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be independent.  These provocations generate the real possibility of a new war between Moscow and Tbilisi.  And Russian experts are not shy about predicting further cases of territorial “revisions.”

Apologists for this policy also claim that we should stop seeing the small states of Eurasia in strategic perspective because, allegedly, geopolitical rivalry with Russia has subsided.   Of course, following this line means abdicating all interest in these regions, foregoing a strategic approach to Eurasia, and abandoning local governments who depend on America for support.  But in fact Washington is doing this.  By refusing to see the visible linkage between the need to end the increasingly dangerous and explosive tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh where repeated incidents are occurring, and the normalization of Armeno-Turkish relations, the Administration has incurred Azerbaijan’s ill will because it clearly feels neglected – while winning no support in Armenia.  And this is despite cabinet visits by Secretaries Gates and Clinton to Baku.

This neglect merely opens the door to Moscow, which, as President Medvedev recently said, sees itself as responsible for security in the region and has moved to assume primacy in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issues. Thus, beyond the deals cited above, Moscow has increased its pressure on Baku to formally desist from using force to recover Nagorno-Karabakh.  Russia sweetened its offer by changing its position on the future disposition of the Lachin corridor to Azerbaijan’s province of Nakhichevan, the birthplace of the ruling Aliyev family to support its return to Azerbaijan.  Reports have also circulated that Moscow wants a military base in Azerbaijan – i.e. an expanded presence for a longer duration at the Qabala air defense base – and also a stronger position in Azerbaijan’s economy.   Russia is particularly eager to integrate Azerbaijan into the Kremlin’s Caspian energy framework.  This objective has taken on an added sense of urgency because Russia, Iran, and Qatar are now seriously exploring the creation of a natural gas cartel, and because Turkmenistan’s gas fields have been shown to be of world-class size.  Azerbaijan, also a major gas producer in the Caspian Basin, is the only holdout that prevents Russia from monopolizing trans-Caspian energy flows to Europe, and it has just signed a deal to ship its gas through Georgia to Romania and Hungary. (See September 15 issue of the Analyst) Therefore tying up its gas exports is vital to Russia’s overall security projects in Eurasia.  During the Russian-Georgian war, Baku, acting prudently, redirected some of its energy flows from the BTC route to Russian installations.  Moscow now wants to make this shift permanent.

CONCLUSIONS: Russian leaders and commentators alike see U.S. policy as an abdication of its position in Eurasia and will press harder to consolidate their advantage, leading to bigger encroachments and more rivalry.  To the extent that America ignores regional developments, there will be still more of the already widespread if concealed discouragement about U.S. policy in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.  Moscow’s recent moves in the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Central Asia, its continuing economic and military pressure on targeted states like Moldova and Georgia indicate Russia’s continuing commitment to a policy based on officially sanctioned geopolitical rivalry with the U.S. in Eurasia.  Indeed, the recently leaked document outlining the new turn in policy towards the U.S. and Europe simultaneously insisted on moves to consolidate even more Moscow’s domination of the CIS.  Energy wars against Belarus, economic pressure, enhanced military threats, and power projection in the Caucasus, and subversion of governments in Kyrgyzstan as in the case of the Bakiyev regime, as well as official documents like the defense doctrine of 2010 all demonstrate Russia’s insistence that the U.S. remains the primary adversary and rival in Eurasia.

U.S. analysts fully grasp that the regional rivalries in Eurasia are the most contentious issue on the US-Russian agenda.  But burying our heads in the sand or misreading Russian policies, interests, and mentalities is not an answer.  Rather it is an evasion of one even if that evasion ultimately constitutes a policy.  One need only examine recent Russian foreign policies across the CIS, not just the Caucasus, to realize that the idea that the U.S. can abandon its responsibilities, interests, and its partners to Russia will bring neither security, nor an end to geopolitical rivalry.  If anything, Russia’s appetite for rivalry will then only grow with the eating.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.