MOUNTING TENSIONS OVER NAGORNO KARABAKH
The ceasefire in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has for the past two years appeared ever more fragile and a recent shootout, which left six soldiers dead, once again demonstrates that the conflict is far from frozen. This incident was explained as a consequence of a breakdown in the ongoing peace talks, but it also reflects mounting tensions ever since the recognition of Kosovo in February 2008. Kosovo’s recognition, the war in Georgia and Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia stirred things up and led to a change in the dynamics of the conflict.
BACKGROUND: A serious incident on the Nagorno Karabakh line of contact on June 18 left four Azerbaijani and two Armenian soldiers dead. The shootout occurred the day after the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents had met in St Petersburg and although there was deep disagreement over the sequence of events, there was widespread consensus that the violence was linked to the failed talks. Armenia argued that Azerbaijan had launched a night-time raid in order to derail the flailing peace process, while Azerbaijan reciprocated by accusing Armenia of using the incident to cover up its diplomatic defeat and its lack of support for the principles underlying the talks.
While the timing of the violence therefore appears linked to these high level talks, it also reflects the mounting tensions that have characterized the conflict since Kosovo’s recognition. Shootings across the line of contact also occurred previously, but the recognition of Kosovo and subsequent international developments changed the dynamics of conflict and led to a gradual thawing of the conflict. The most serious incident occurred a few weeks after Kosovo’s recognition when more than a dozen soldiers were killed (the exact number is contested) and heavy artillery reportedly was used.
The recognition of Kosovo led to fears in Azerbaijan that an unwanted precedent had been set: the recognition of autonomous provinces against the will of their ‘parent states’. The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, spoke out strongly against Kosovo’s recognition and declared that, if necessary, force would be used to regain control over Karabakh and that weapons and military equipment had been acquired for that purpose. The fear of a precedent was reinforced by Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was – as one would expect - welcomed by the de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh. The war in Georgia demonstrated the danger of trying to reintegrate breakaway territories through the use of force, but it also illustrated the fragility of unrecognized states. South Ossetia was only able to withstand the Georgian offensive due to Russian military backing, and although Karabakh can rely on support from Armenia, this is no substitute for great power backing. Moreover, Russia made clear that it had no intention of recognizing Karabakh.
These developments therefore resulted in insecurity on both sides and a reassessment of strategies, and combined with increasing international pressure, this revitalized the peace process. Meetings become increasingly frequent, a declaration of principles was signed in November 2008 and a breakthrough was declared to be imminent. At the same time, however, the ceasefire continued to appear decidedly fragile. Shootings across the line of contact continued, large-scale military exercises were staged and warnings of military offenses or pre-emptive strikes became commonplace. And after a flurry of optimism, the peace process slowly ground to a halt.
IMPLICATIONS: Observers nevertheless argue that the international environment is currently favorable for a settlement or at least for a framework agreement, which would essentially amount to a public acceptance of the principles underlying the talks. This optimism is based on the increased great power attention following the Georgian war, and the pressure from both the U.S. and Russia for a settlement. This attention has not diminished, despite lack of progress, as evidenced by Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Another cause for optimism is the gradual, if problematic, rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. This process of normalization was recently suspended, but it has been argued that by linking the opening of borders to progress in the Karabakh talks, Turkey might be holding out a necessary carrot for the Armenian leadership.
However, conditions were arguably more opportune shortly after the war in Georgia. That war, along with the recognition of Kosovo, created an urgency on both sides which has otherwise been missing since the 1994 ceasefire. Azerbaijan feared a precedent, but also the possible consequences of a military offensive. Meanwhile, in Karabakh the status quo suddenly seemed a lot more fragile and the leaders were faced with a fearful population and doubts over how best to pursue their goal of international recognition. But this urgency has now all but disappeared: the war did not spread and no new basis for the recognition of states appears to have been created. The dynamics of conflict have consequently moved closer to where they were before February 2008. International pressure still creates a sense of nervousness of both sides, but the favorable international environment now runs up against significant internal constraints.
One of the main obstacles is found in a lack of domestic preparedness for compromise; the leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan have for years described the conflict in highly emotive zero-sum terms and the population is consequently unprepared for the difficult compromises that a settlement would entail. When combined with politically insecure leaders, such as the Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan – who looks unlikely to be able to bring his followers with him in compromise – this raises the specter of a backlash. Sargsyan has attempted to ensure greater internal cohesion by reaching out to both opposition parties and NGOs, and similar initiatives have been seen in Azerbaijan, but in none of the cases does the internal situation bode well for a settlement. The politics of Nagorno-Karabakh is less often examined, but the Karabakh leaders should be considered veto players and they have in the past demonstrated their power to bring down an Armenian president they considered too moderate. The entity’s internal dynamics are therefore also of significance. However, the problem here is not a gap between the leaders and the population, or between the government and the opposition. Instead we find consensus on the intransigent position: opposition is as good as non-existent and the government, like the population, rejects compromise. The uncertainty which followed the war in Georgia could have spurred the leaders to look for alternatives, but they now again appear to have little reason to compromise.
CONCLUSIONS: Violence is not always a bad sign for peace processes. It can also signify that an agreement is getting closer, that more is at stake, and that the leaders have to assure their followers that they are not compromising from a position of weakness. Given the secrecy of the Karabakh talks, we cannot know how well they are progressing, but the signs are not promising. The latest meeting appeared to have ended in failure, but more importantly, the urgency created by the Georgian war has largely been squandered and internal obstacles remain significant. This does not mean that the deliberate launch of a military offensive is likely, but it does suggest a more volatile stalemate with all the risks that this entails.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Nina Caspersen is Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at Lancaster University, United Kingdom.
