WASHINGTON MOVES TO REPAIR RELATIONS WITH AZERBAIJAN
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' visit to Azerbaijan seems to have succeeded in its likely purpose to exercise damage control. The free fall in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations, which had been ongoing for over a year, seems to have been arrested. Rebuilding trust and re-establishing America's role in Azerbaijan and the wider region will nevertheless require continued and sustained measures.
BACKGROUND: On June 6, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates traveled to Baku to meet President Ilham Aliyev and Defense Minister Safar Abiyev. The bilateral talks focused on U.S.-Azerbaijan military cooperation, Azerbaijan’s assistance to the U.S. in anti-terror operations in Afghanistan, past and future use of Azerbaijani land and air space for the transport of U.S. troops and supplies to Afghanistan. Secretary Gates thanked the Azerbaijani leadership for this continuous support and brought a letter from President Barack Obama, addressed to President Aliyev. In the letter, President Obama expressed gratitude to Azerbaijan for its assistance to global and regional security, and stated his desire to maintain a dialogue with President Aliyev on key issues of mutual importance.
Azerbaijani media outlets have also reported that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is planning a visit to Azerbaijan sometime next month. If this visit takes place, it will be the first time in post-Soviet history of Azerbaijan that the chiefs of the Pentagon and State Department pay back-to-back visits to this small, but strategically important republic.
In addition to these developments, President Obama on May 25 nominated Matthew J. Bryza as the next ambassador to Azerbaijan. The move came after a year-long absence of a U.S. ambassador in Baku. The absence of an ambassador was perceived by the Azerbaijani public and policy-makers as an indicator of Washington’s lack of interest for and focus on this country. Some even argued that the U.S. was intentionally delaying the process of nomination of an ambassador. Whatever the reasons are, the bilateral relations indeed worsened in past months.
The U.S. and Azerbaijan had enjoyed very warm relations ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, thanks to the strategic partnership on energy issues, such as the signing of the 1994 “Contract of the Century”, the construction of Baku-Supsa, Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Erzurum pipelines. After the 2001 terror attacks in the U.S., Azerbaijan became one of the first countries to render assistance to the U.S.. Both countries became locked up in serious military and security cooperation, with Azerbaijan being the only Muslim country in the world to send troops to both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Yet, relations slowed down in the past two years. Although Azerbaijan had long complained about unjust policies of the U.S. Congress, influenced by a powerful Armenian lobby, the decision of the State Department to vote against a resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh, sponsored by Azerbaijan at the UN General Assembly in March 2008 was the first blow to bilateral relations in their current stage. Azerbaijanis perceived the gesture as a stab in the back. Then came the Russian-Georgian war and the clear absence of any coherent and strong policy on the part of U.S. towards security in the South Caucasus. This led Azerbaijan to reconsider the assumptions of its foreign policy.
However, the real damage to bilateral relations came with President Obama’s push for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. Official Baku perceived this policy as a hit to its national security and the overall peace process over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Azerbaijani political establishment, as well as the wider public, believes that the Turkish border with Armenia should only be opened after Armenia withdraws its military forces from the occupied Azerbaijani lands. Without this pre-condition, official Baku believes, the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement will only damage the peace process by alienating Azerbaijan, eliminating the only remaining peaceful incentive for Armenia to withdraw from the occupied territories, and emboldening official Yerevan on the negotiation table. Suspicion and frustration mounted in Baku as Washington kept pushing on Ankara to sign protocols with Yerevan. President Aliyev even refused to attend an Istanbul conference on civilizational dialogue in April 2009, despite the invitation from senior U.S. policy makers. Azerbaijani leaders were perplexed that the U.S. would treat its strategic ally in such a way. Excluding Azerbaijan from the Turkish-Armenian talks and insisting on the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations without consideration of Azerbaijan’s national interests hurt the image of the U.S. in Azerbaijan.
Then came an opposition-written article in the Washington Post and reports by Freedom House and the State Department on the state of human rights in Azerbaijan that were perceived as factually wrongful by the government. Finally, US$ 8 million assistance to the separatist regime in Nagorno-Karabakh added extra fuel to the fire.
In April 2010, the head of the Presidential Administration’s Political Affairs Department, Ali Hasanov, even threatened that Azerbaijani would reconsider its relations with the U.S.. Some analysts have argued that Azerbaijan, being upset with U.S. policies, would be likely to turn towards Russia. Gas contracts signed with Gazprom last summer were initial signs for such possible shift in Azerbaijani foreign policy.
IMPLICATIONS: The latest U.S. initiatives seem to be aimed at repairing the worsening relations between Washington and Baku. Secretary Gates’ visit appears to have psychologically and symbolically stopped the tide of negativism in bilateral relations. Once again, the U.S. has shown that the South Caucasus and the Caspian basin remains an important region for its national interests. With the recent turmoil in Kyrgyzstan and the uncertain fate of the U.S. military base there, U.S. Defense Forces look at the South Caucasus as an alternative reliable transport route to Afghanistan. Thus, improving U.S.-Azerbaijani relations can increase the U.S. military cooperation with South Caucasus countries.
The normalization of U.S.-Azerbaijani relations is good not only for these two countries, but also for the entire region. Coincidentally, in the same week that Secretary Gates was in Baku, President Aliyev traveled to Istanbul to sign bilateral gas export agreements with Turkey, thus further strengthening the East-West energy corridor, backed by U.S. officials, and significantly contributing to Europe’s energy security. The U.S.-Azerbaijani cooperation, once re-charged again, can touch upon new spheres, such as health, science, education, cultural diplomacy, areas mainly forgotten in 1990s. Cooperation and mutual understanding on such sensitive issues as democracy and human rights is also possible and can be more easily achieved among friends than hostile countries.
Finally, it can affect the peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh, if Washington manages to restore the trust of Azerbaijani politicians in unbiased mediation by Washington. Inclusion of Azerbaijan into the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and linking the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border to the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani lands will bring more sustainable, comprehensive peace to the region.
More U.S. attention to Azerbaijan will help restore the geopolitical balance of power in the region. After the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, many analysts argued that the Kremlin is coming back to dominate the region and that the U.S. is unwilling or unable to counter this trend. Indeed, toothless U.S. actions during and after that war led many to question Washington’s ability to provide security for its allies in post-Soviet republics. It seemed like the South Caucasus would once again be dominated by Russia. The improvement in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations can help reverse that perception. Geopolitical balance in this vital region is much preferable for regional peace and stability than domination by one power.
CONCLUSIONS: U.S.-Azerbaijan relations seem to have hit rock bottom and are about to be bounced back. It seems like after almost two years of one-sided policies, official Washington has realized the importance of Azerbaijan as a key regional country both in terms of providing energy security but also contributing to the stability and economic development of the regional countries. It is apparent that without Azerbaijan, the push for Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is doomed to failure. Without Azerbaijan, military operations in Afghanistan would become much harder. Without Azerbaijan, America’s presence and influence in the Caspian basin would be reduced. Thus, it is important to continue to mend relations with Baku in order to achieve the broader goals that the Obama administration has put in front of itself: regional peace, stability and development.
