GEORGIA’S LOCAL ELECTIONS: REVITALIZING THE ROSE REVOLUTION?

On May 30, Georgian citizens went to the polls to vote in local elections. At stake were issues well beyond the socio-economic problems debated during pre-election campaigning. Apart from being an ordeal for the ruling United National Movement, already strained by war and street protests, the local elections served as a critical test of the fairness of Georgia’s electoral framework and, ultimately, for the country’s prospects of overcoming political polarisation. In the end, the ruling party came out of the elections strengthened. More importantly, initial signs indicate that Georgia may be revitalizing the democratic ideals espoused by the “rose revolutionaries”.

BACKGROUND: International observers, along with an increasing pool of dissidents from within Georgia’s ruling party, have for several years criticized the government’s ineptitude in deepening democratic reform. Overbearing executive powers, the inadequate independence of courts, the unequal electoral playing field and unsatisfactory media freedom have repeatedly been identified as sore points. Disillusionment with the stagnant revolution inspired some MPs to boycott parliament following their election in May 2008 and led to recurrent street protests, e.g. in November 2007 and April 2009. Strained by these events and by the August 2008 war with Russia, Saakashvili promised reforms of the election code, discussions on constitutional reform as well as pre-term local elections, including (for the first-time) direct mayoral elections in Tbilisi.

Although some opposition leaders refused to be appeased by these pledges, the popular mood in June 2009 was decidedly in favour of negotiation. After intense wrangling, the inter-party working group on electoral reform proposed some significant changes. These included expanding the number of seats in the Tbilisi City Council to 50, whereby 25 members were to be elected in single-mandate districts (no threshold) and 25 through a party-list, proportional system (a four percent threshold). In order to strengthen the equality of votes, regulations were adopted requiring the delineation of new majoritarian constituencies in Tbilisi. Other amendments enabled some opposition parties to check voters’ lists and provided more balanced procedures for selecting representatives to the three-tiered structure of election commissions. A 30 percent threshold was eventually introduced for the Tbilisi mayoral elections, with a run-off to be held between the two most popular candidates if no one surpassed this limit. However, several opposition parties refused to accept this provision, since it was considered conducive to diluting, and therefore weakening, the opposition vote.

Continuing disagreements between moderates and radicals over whether to unseat the government through elections or street protests, as well as over how to manage relations with Russia, rendered the opposition unable to coordinate its actions during the run-up to the elections. Significantly, the opposition proved unable to select a single candidate for the mayoral elections, even though – or perhaps because – this position is considered a springboard for the presidential elections scheduled for 2013. The incumbent United National Movement (UNM) and its Tbilisi mayoral candidate Gigi Ugulava therefore faced no less than four major opposition candidates (Irakli Alasania representing the Alliance for Georgia; Giorgi Chanturia representing the Christian-Democratic Movement; Zviad Dzidziguri representing the National Council; and Gigi Topadze representing Industry Will Save Georgia), as well as four less known candidates during the May 30 local elections.

IMPLICATIONS: As polls had predicted, the ruling UNM secured a landslide victory, retaining a majority in all 63 municipal councils outside the capital and gaining 39 of 50 seats in the Tbilisi City Council. The incumbent Gigi Ugulava also won the mayoral race with a solid 55 percent of the vote, even though Tbilisi is considered an opposition stronghold. In short, the ruling party came out of the elections strengthened, despite several years of recurrent signs of popular discontent.

The local elections may also lead to a revitalization of the democratic ideals espoused by the “rose revolutionaries”. According to the assessment of the OSCE-ODIHR monitoring mission, the elections “marked evident progress towards meeting OSCE and Council of Europe commitments”. Nonetheless, the elections were not deemed “exemplary”, as had been called for by President Saakashvili. Monitors noted “significant remaining shortcomings” including “deficiencies in the legal framework, its implementation, an uneven playing field, and isolated cases of election-day fraud”. Some of the problems singled out were provisions in the electoral code which allowed single-mandate districts outside Tbilisi to be drawn without regard to their number of voters (effectively undermining the equality of votes) and rules permitting what is considered use of administrative resources by international standards. The use of state resources for the benefit for the ruling party, the unbalanced (but highly diverse) media environment and instances of intimidation against voter and opposition activists did skew the electoral contest in favour of the UNM. However, these problems were more severe outside the capital, which was the only locality considered to be of major political importance by all contestants. The monitoring mission also described the work of the election administration as “professional, transparent and inclusive”; commended the efforts done to improve the quality of voters’ lists; praised the balanced reporting of the Georgian Public Broadcaster; and welcomed the government’s attempts to address wrongdoings through the Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections.

These advancements, albeit limited, bode well for the prospects of overcoming Georgia’s intransigent cycles of “street politics”. The reactions by opposition parties to the election results have certainly been as divergent as ever. Moderate opposition groups have largely accepted the outcome, whereas the more radical opposition forces have dismissed them as unfair. Giorgi Chanturia of the Christian-Democratic Movement described the elections as a “step forward towards the development of democracy”; and Irakli Alasania of the Alliance for Georgia referred to them as “valid – despite significant shortcomings”. By contrast, the National Council argued that “the election results are not based on the free choice of the Georgian citizens”. Extreme oppositionists such as Nino Burjanadze’s party Democratic Movement – United Georgia, who boycotted the elections, have described them as an outright ruse serving as a tool for regime justification.

However, a careful assessment of the elections results, weighed against the evaluation of international monitors, lends credence to the interpretation that moderate opposition groups in fact constitute the most powerful oppositional factions. The monitors’ fairly favourable conclusions suggest that the more radical opposition groups are trying to rationalize their failure to gain traction over a solid part of the electorate by blaming it exclusively on procedural shortcomings. But the radical parts of the opposition arguably discredited themselves by interpreting the widespread disagreement with the government’s policy towards Russia as a mandate to engage Moscow behind the government’s back. Radical opposition groups therefore seem to be on a trajectory towards marginalisation, whereas there appears to be an underlying public demand for moderate opposition representatives.

This development will, in turn, strengthen moderate opposition forces in their pursuit of gradually pushing for a more balanced electoral framework; and alleviate the government’s fears of radical oppositional groups that are often perceived as Moscow’s “Trojan horses”. The ruling party’s election experiences may even create incentives for further reform, since the rudimentary agreement on the electoral framework allowed for a renewed focus on the substantive issues of concern to most voters; an area where the UNM, and its mayoral candidate, already had a strong track-record in terms of reforms and economic progress.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s local elections provide initial signs towards a possible revitalization of the democratic goals of the Rose Revolution. The gradualist approach by the moderate opposition has been vindicated. The radical opposition appears marginalized; and the ruling party’s fear of Russian “Trojan horses” should decrease correspondingly. Indirectly, the UNM may even have reaped the benefits of arranging elections under circumstances where substantial matters could gain more attention than procedural shortcomings, thus creating incentives for deepening democratic reform.

These positive signs notwithstanding, the democratic promises of the Rose Revolution are bound to hang in the balance for some time. Developments concerning the draft constitution will prove decisive in overcoming Georgia’s cycles of “street politics” in the long run. Although the recently revealed constitutional draft appears to meet persistent demands for improved checks and balances, fears are already being expressed that the amendments are being tailored in order to give Saakashvili a comeback option as his final term ends in 2013, and even moderate opposition forces have promised an “irreconcilable” response to such attempts at constitutional engineering.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Christofer Berglund is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Uppsala University and a Visiting Researcher at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies.