EU DEPLOYS OBSERVERS IN GEORGIA
On October 1, the EU began deploying the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia which is to consist of over 200 observers from 22 EU member states, and additional staff reaching a total of 352. The EUMM’s headquarters are located in Tbilisi, and regional offices are set up in the towns of Gori, Poti and Zugdidi. The EUMM is tasked with monitoring the situation on the ground, overseeing the compliance of the conflicting parties with the August six-point agreement, and the return of refugees, as well as facilitating confidence building measures between the parties. The EUMM will coordinate its work with the OSCE mission in South Ossetia and UNOMIG in Abkhazia.
The EUMM on its first day conducted a total of fourteen patrols in areas close to Abkhazia and South Ossetia and was reportedly at three locations allowed to enter the Russian-controlled “security zone” around South Ossetia. The security zone entry was allowed in spite of statements made by a Russian military spokesperson on September 30, that the observers would not be granted access to the security zones until the division of roles had been determined between the EUMM and the Russian peacekeeping forces.
Russia agreed to the October 1 EUMM deployment during President Sarkozy’s visit to Moscow on September 8, where it was also settled that Russian troops must withdraw from the security zones into Abkhazia and South Ossetia by October 10 and allow the EUMM permanent access to the zones. While it remains to be seen whether Russia will honor its commitment to withdraw, the continued implementation of the six-point agreement will present even thornier issues.
The original wording of the six-point agreement clearly states that all forces must withdraw to the positions held before August 7, implying Russia would eventually also need to pull out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, regions Russia is now recognizing as independent states. Russia has clearly stated its intention to retain its military forces in these regions, in numbers far exceeding the pre-conflict peacekeeping contingents located there. In effect, it seems that French diplomacy has left the issue aside for now, focusing on Russian withdrawal from the security zones and preparing the way for the introduction of the EUMM.
This focus may well be reasonable, allowing for resolving contentious issues one step at a time. However, the EU’s ambition is to gradually extend EUMM observation to also include South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia is very unlikely to allow such activities and has claimed that a potential EUMM presence must be approved by the independent governments of the two regions. Thus, the EUMM may end up monitoring only the de facto borders between Georgia and these regions, thus being unable to fulfill its mandate.
At the international talks on the conflict to be held in Geneva on October 15, the EU will seek to secure continued Russian compliance with the six-point agreement, and among other issues hopes to negotiate an extension of the EUMM’s monitoring to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The outcomes of these talks will have consequences for the currently frozen negotiations on a new EU-Russian Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). From Russia’s perspective, it is imperative to normalize its relations with its main EU partners Germany, Italy and France if such negotiations are to be reassumed. Granting the EUMM a presence in the security zones may well be one such measure to regain lost credibility among these partners.
The heavily Russia-skeptical, newer EU members are unlikely to settle for anything less than a full Russian compliance with the six-point agreement before accepting renewed negotiations. Nevertheless, allowing the EUMM access to the security zones and a gradual Russian withdrawal from these may well be viewed as sufficient signs of Russian “good will” for the heavyweight member states to advocate a restart of PCA negotiations. While the EU has so far tried hard to form a common approach to the Russian-Georgian conflict, such developments would likely again provide for a deepened wedge within the Union over preferable policies toward Russia.
