GEORGIA: THE SPLIT THAT SPLIT THE SCO
The war in Georgia, and the ensuing Russian recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia has become a serious issue for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an organization that has thrived on its normative and security cohesion. Some SCO members, most prominently China, have their own problems with separatism and were never about to support the separation of the two Georgian regions from the Motherland, as it could create a precedent for their own separatist regions. This policy trumped any concern for SCO cohesion and hopes for further regional integration. While Russia undoubtedly expected stronger support from its friends, its failure to receive any is likely to impact the future of the organization, and also, potentially, bilateral relations between Russia and the SCO members.
BACKGROUND: Much like Georgia, many SCO members, including Russia, have been plagued by ethnic and political violence. Calls from different ethnic groups for the right to secede and establish independent states – or as a minimum far reaching authonomy that could lead to independence in the future – has been a perennial problem. To take just one example, China combats separatism in Taiwan and Tibet, as well as in Xinjiang; and the issue of China’s integrity overrides all other issues from Beijing’s perspective. The SCO has functioned as a bulwark against such tendencies, and there has been a great deal of reluctance to accept any international pressure to concede the creation of new states, for fear that it could create a precedent in international politics. Granted, there are major differences in the different situations, but China and the other SCO members have traditionally been very reluctant to accept any developments in this direction.
When the West pressured for the recognition of Kosovo, there was a strong support among SCO members for keeping Serbia intact. China, among others, voiced strong concern over what such recognition could lead to, arguing that it could lead to other regions demanding independence in the future. Of course, China and the SCO members were most concerned with their own states, not the principles per se.
The current situation came out of the political tensions between Georgia and Russia, which increased ever since Georgia turned away from Moscow and towards the West. This resulted in Russia using the lever of its control over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, among other through the deployment of “peacekeepers”, handing out Russian passports to the regions’ inhabitants, and appointing Russian officials to their governments. This amounted to a de facto annexation of these regions in an effort to weaken Georgia, which culminated with the events this August that led to the Russian invasion of Georgia and the Russian recognition of these regions as “independent” states. Effectively, of course, this put the separatist regions under Russian rule.
The SCO did voice support for “Russia’s active role” in resolving the conflict in Georgia, but it refrained from recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This proved a major failure for Russia. In the “Dushanbe Declaration” that concluded the SCO’s annual meeting, the heads of state voiced concern over the recent tensions and called on all parties to solve the situation through dialogue and negotiations. This effectively called the Russian invasion of Georgia and the separation of two of its provinces as illegal from an SCO perspective. However, more important than what was actually said, was the deafening silence that came from the SCO members. During the entire course of the conflict, none of the SCO members adopted a supportive position towards Russia, rather viewing developments with increasing and obvious disaffection. The absence of any communicated support for Russia can only be read as tacit support for the Georgian predicament and that country’s territorial integrity, not only out of support for international law but for the sake of the narrow self-interest of the states concerned. In effect, the SCO member states’ national interests took precedence over regional cooperation in this situation.
It is evident that the SCO members did agree on avoiding the crisis in Georgia, and in the final declaration it was only briefly mentioned to avoid the crisis in Georgia from taking over the summit meeting. In sum, the failure of Russia to gain support is significant.
IMPLICATIONS: The results of this impasse could be devastating for the SCO, an organization that has thrived on its normative and security cohesion. It is apparent that while the SCO has made some progress in the past few years, it is also clear that the SCO has some major weaknesses, most prominently the clear mutual distrust among its member states. The failure to show support will not go unnoticed by Russia, which has not only been isolated internationally but now also by its friends, with a few exceptions.
Russia undoubtedly understands the difficulties for China and the Central Asian states in supporting the independence of Georgia’s regions, but the split in the SCO will nevertheless have significant implications for the future. In an organization that had been based on institutional strength, the consequences might have mattered less. Yet in a trust-based structure such as the SCO, this will prevent, or at least destabilize, further integration in the short to medium term.
The SCO has developed into something stronger than a feeble organisation dominated by Russian interests. This episode will in fact strengthen the Chinese position in the organization, as it has made Beijing look both more stable politically, as well as adopting a security perception that is remarkably more similar to that of the Central Asian states than Russia’s.
The impact of the Georgian war for the SCO should not be exaggerated. Yet it has become increasingly apparent that the Central Asian states fear the resurgence of a more confident and aggressive Russia, and if the invasion of Georgia represents a reconquista of Moscow’s Near Abroad, the Central Asian states recognize that they too may be in Moscow’s sights. Tajikistan has also begun to revise the Russian military presence at Hissar Airport.
CONCLUSIONS: Russia seems to have overestimated the level of support that it was likely to obtain from among its friends and partners around the world, and nowhere is this more notable and potentially serious than in the SCO. The SCO is a relatively fragile organization that is likely to manage such a division badly, and it is likely that there will be a slowdown in the economic and security cooperation in the organization. Moreover, it is not unlikely that Russia will react negatively to the absence of demonstrable support; but in the short-term an isolated Russia is dependent even on relatively neutral states such as the SCO members. Russia’s politically questionable attempt to recognize the separatist structures such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia has directly put Russia on a different path compared to the rest of the SCO members, with the likely result that the Chinese role in the organization – and in Central Asia – will be strengthened.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Niklas Swanström is co-director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm, and Editor of the China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, the quarterly journal of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.
