ENCLAVE POLITICS BETWEEN BISHKEK AND TASHKENT POISON RELATIONS

The
Soviet legacy has left the Central Asian states with many disputed lands that
have a potential of growing into serious conflicts. The delimitation of the
1920s was aimed at dividing Turkistan in such a way that the newly formed
republics would become constituting parts of one industrial whole, rather than
to create solid nation-states. Among other, this led to the creation of
numerous enclaves of one republic surrounded by the territory of another.
During the Soviet era, borders and enclaves had only administrative
significance and did not pose many problems to republican or central
authorities. Today, however, border issues are among the most frequently
discussed topics.

For
the last two weeks the Kyrgyz-Uzbek frontier and the enclaves have been the
top news in all Kyrgyzstani mass media. The reason for this was the
publication of the secret Memorandum on regulating Kyrgyz-Uzbek state
borders’ delimitation, in one of the Batken regional newspapers Batken
Tany (April 20,2001). the second clause of the Memorandum stroke
Kyrgyzstani people and provoked a big scandal. It states that the parties
(Prime Ministers of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Bakiev and Sultanov,
respectively) agreed that ‘it is expedient to attach Sokh enclave, Uzbek
territory, to the Rishtan region of the Republic of Uzbekistan along the Sokh
river avoiding Kyrgyz populated areas…’

One
of the most widely read newspapers, Vechernii Bishkek, called the
Memorandum the ‘price for gas’ deliveries, which Uzbekistan cut off in
January due to a big Kyrgyz debt. Many observers support the newspapers view,
saying that the Uzbek Prime Minister’s 26 February visit to Bishkek was
actually aimed at signing a deal with Kyrgyzstan on a land swap rather than
negotiating about gas. They believe that ‘technical fractures’ were just a
cover for Tashkent to cut off gas deliveries during the coldest period of
winter, the end of January, and thus to create an environment to press Bakiev
to sign the memorandum. Tashkent had already long expressed its intentions to
persuade Bishkek to give it a wide corridor of Kyrgyz land in order to link
Uzbekistan proper with the 11000-hectares Sokh enclave. In return, Uzbekistan
promised to solve all the problems with the Kyrgyz gas debt. Until recently,
Kyrgyzstan rejected such propositions saying that they go against its national
interests.

There
are several reasons why almost all the parliamentarians, journalists and
common people are opposed to the implementation of the memorandum. First, if
the document is implemented, Kyrgyzstan would lose the only well-equipped
highway connecting the south of Kyrgyzstan with the Batken region. Secondly,
the strategically important Batken region, where Islamic militant incursions
have taken place in previous years, would practically become an enclave, cut
off from the Kyrgyz territory by the Sokh corridor to Uzbekistan. Last but not
least, the memorandum assigns Uzbekistan the territory ‘along the river Sokh’,
thus enabling Uzbekistan to gain control over the source of water, which is
crucial to the region.

The
Kyrgyz Prime Minister was subsequently accused of violating the constitution.
According to the Constitution of the republic, the parliament is the only
competent body to decide on issues of this magnitude. The deputy speaker of
Parliament Tekebaev, cited in the newspaper Res Publica, called the
memorandum ‘criminal negligence on the part of the Prime Minister’.
However, he added that Bakiev was not the only one responsible for the deal,
but that in his view, the President was also aware of the memorandum.
According to Tekebaev, Akaev promised Uzbek President a wide corridor of
Kyrgyz land in return for Karimov’s support prior to the 2000 Kyrgyz
presidential elections. The Bakiev-led government responded to the accusations
by admitting the fact that Uzbek side has been pushing Kyrgyzstan for
territorial exchange for a long time, and in February Kyrgyz officials agreed
to consider their propositions. Government officials emphasized the last
phrase in the second clause of the memorandum, where it is said that
Kyrgyzstan agreed to link Sokh to Uzbekistan only if an ‘adequate
compensation equal to the value of the South Sokh territory enabling
Kyrgyzstan to build a new road’ is provided by Uzbekistan. In his interview
with the newspaper Erkin Too, Bakiev reported that he himself
traveled to the Batken region in March to look at the territory Uzbekistan was
offering in return for the corridor: ‘The offered mountainous Tayan region
didn’t correspond with Kyrgyzstan’s national interests’. In the words of
Bakiev, the proposed land did not correspond to the value of the land
Kyrgyzstan was supposed to give up. The land is suitable neither for building
an alternative highway, nor for agriculture. Bakiev strongly denied any
relationship between the memorandum and the resumption of Uzbek gas deliveries
to Kyrgyzstan, saying that gas, water and land issues are all settled
separately.

In
the interview to RFE/RL an official of the border delimitation commission said
that the Memorandum was to be kept secret because ‘if published it could
damage the negotiating process, since not everyone can properly understand the
negotiations’. However, according to the newspaper Vechernii Bishkek,
the memorandum was made available to the Uzbekistani people already in
February. Regional governor of Batken Mr. Ayblayev noted that the Uzbek
authorities are spreading leaflets with the memorandum among local people,
thus trying to coerce Kyrgyzstan to fulfill the commitments stated in the
document. Under public pressure the government on April 24 declared that it
denounced the memorandum. Bakiev said that since the Uzbek side did not
fulfill its obligations, Kyrgyzstan will not carry out its part of the deal. 

Different
observers make various predictions concerning the future of Kyrgyz-Uzbek
relations. All of them agree that the memorandum’s incident will play a
negative role in rapidly deteriorating the relationship between the two
countries. Some warn that Uzbekistan might cut off its gas deliveries again,
and that it can block many important highways that pass through its territory
connecting Kyrgyzstan with the outside world. Many are afraid that in the
present situation, with a looming threat of Islamic militants’ attack, the
current Kyrgyz-Uzbek dispute will have a negative effect on the military and
political capacity of Central Asian states to organize strong resistance to
the insurgents.

Maria
Utyaganova,
student, department of International Relations, American University in
Kyrgyzstan.