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Published on Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst (http://cacianalyst.org)

GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS

By Johanna Petersson, a visiting researcher at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International (11/07/2001 issue of the CACI Analyst)

mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze dismissed his
entire government on Thursday November 1st. This followed a turbulent week as
the people of Tbilisi took to the streets and demonstrated, initially against
what they saw as a breech of the principle of free speech after the ministry
of state security (Georgia’ s post-Soviet version of the KGB) attempted a
raid on the independent and hugely popular TV station Rustavi 2. However, the
demonstrations soon turned into a protest against Shevardnadze and the current
regime. On Wednesday, over 10,000 people demonstrated in front of the
parliament, some demanding the resignation of Shevardnadze and the Minister of
Interior Kakha Targamadze; some calling for new legislative elections. Though
Shevardnadze admitted that the action taken by the state security police was
wrong, he openly defended the Minister of Interior, saying that if Targamadze,
and the general prosecutor Gia Meparishivili, would be forced to resign, then
so would he. After parliamentary chairman Zurab Zhvania’ s resignation and
the dismissal of the entire government, the demonstrations outside the
parliament have largely petered out.

mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">Shevardnadze also promised swift constitutional changes
last week; the creation of a more parliamentary style of government in Georgia
with a cabinet of ministers and a more powerful Prime Minister. On Monday, he
indicated that the Prime Minister would be in charge of economic affairs
whilst the right to appoint and dismiss ministers would stay with the
president. These changes can be seen as concessions to his opponents who have
long demanded a more limited role for the president. However, by dismissing
the government Shevardnadze has managed to hold at least part of the
initiative in a very volatile situation. 

mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">As usual in the Caucasus, where conspiracy theories
flourish and politics sometimes take Byzantine forms, the question many
analysts ask is if the dismissal really was a result of last week’s
demonstrations outside the parliament or a carefully orchestrated
manipulation. Many theories and rumours are circulating, the main theory being
that this was largely organised to give legitimacy to a new government and,
more importantly, perhaps to an heir to Shevardnadze’s throne. Many also
feel that Shevardnadze had not expected the strong public support the
demonstrations and his opponents enjoyed, that things were getting out of his
control – hence it is argued that the instability now prevalent in the
country was not planned.

mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">Also as a result of last week’s turmoil, the already
divided Citizens’ Union of Georgia has been divided into even further
factions and during the last few days there have been signs that Shevardnadze
is seeking support and forming a new alliance with the authoritarian leader of
the autonomous republic of Ajara. Aslan Abashidze, Russian-leaning and widely
perceived as corrupt, is also a member of the Revival of Georgia faction,
besuides his post as head of Ajara. Abashidze was re-elected last weekend in
an election with no opponents; official sources claims that there had been a
96 % turnout and that 99% voted for Mr. Abashidze. 

mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">Shevardnadze visited Adjara on Saturday the 2nd of
November. During his visit, Abashidze was asked to act to head the efforts to
solve the Abkhazian conflict, an interesting choice since the Ajara region is
run largely without control from the government central government in Tbilisi.
Fears have been long present that it too could opt for even greater autonomy
or independence. Abashidze is also seen by some as a candidate to the post of
Prime Minister, however, due to fears of being assassinated, Abashidze has not
visited Tbilisi for ten years and a more likely candidate might be someone
else closely linked to him.

mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">Former parliamentary chairman Zhvania's future role is
also still unclear, he is of course mentioned as a strong candidate to the
post of prime minister. Keeping him and former Justice Minister Mikhail
Saakashvili out of the government can be a very risky step due to the recent
public display of popularity for these outspoken reformers.

mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">The next two weeks will indeed have great impact on
Georgia’s future economic and democratic development, as Shevardnadze’s
choice of government and especially prime minister will become clearer.
Indications have come from the president that the government will be basically
similar to the last, with the exception of the ministers most closely linked
to the Rustavi 2 affair - Minister of State Security Kutateladze, and Minister
of Interior Targamadze. Until last week, Targamadze and the interior forces
were largely seen as Shevardnadze's closest allies within the government, and
Shevardnadze is widely regarded as not having strong control over the
military. Part of his power base has always been within the interior forces
and the National Guard, not the ministry of defence. This makes the choice of
Prime Minister even more interesting. 

mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">The demonstrations carried out last week were one of
the first large-scale displays of public dismay during the ten years or so of
Shevardnadze regime. Shevardnadze is now faced not only with the need to
balance the different interests within the region, the government, and the
parliament but also that of the Georgian people.

"Lucida Bright";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">Johanna Petersson EN-GB">, a visiting researcher at the 10.0pt;font-family:"Lucida Bright"">Georgian Foundation for Strategic
and International Studies, Tbilisi.


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