PASHTUN DISAFFECTION: THREAT TO STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN:

BACKGROUND: Resentment among the Pashtun tribes
are composed of political, economic, and religious factors. The most obvious factor is the
political: the Pashtuns are by far the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, yet have been
sidelined in the interim government. Though no reliable demographic figures are available,
the Pashtuns compose between 40 and 62 percent of Afghanistan\'s population (the latter
figure is from a detailed study done by the WAK foundation), whereas the second largest
group, the Tajiks, form from 15 to 25 percent. Yet the present interim government is
heavily dominated by the Tajiks, and specifically from Tajiks from the Panjsher valley.
While the nominal head of the interim government, Hamid Karzai, is an ethnic Pashtun, his
power is restricted by the firm Tajik control over the power ministries. The most blatant
situation is in the defense ministry, where 37 of 38 high-ranking officers in the
embryonic Afghan national army are Tajiks, and of them, 29 are Panjsheris. Many Pashtun
tribal leaders see Karzai, who only returned from exile after the U.S. military campaign
started in October, as a puppet, a virtual
\'uncle Tom\', in the hands of the Panjsheri power ministers; Bacha Khan openly argues as
much.

On another level, the tribal
Pashtuns did not share the strong disaffection with the Taliban that Afghans in the North
and in the urban areas (especially Kabul) felt. In fact, the codes enforced by the Taliban
merely reflected their own traditional customs and ways of life, though implemented more
severely. The brand of Islam espoused in the Pashtun areas is significantly more austere
and closer to Taliban ideology than the more Sufi type of Islam practices either to their
North by Tajiks, Uzbeks or Turkmens, or to their South by Punjabis or Sindhis.

Finally, economically, the
heightened border controls between Pakistan and Afghanistan since September 11 has done
significant damage to the cross-bordr trade and smuggling that constituted a large part of
the economy of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. These areas are
strongly feeling an economic pinch. Given the Pashtun code of hospitality and the strong
ideological and ethnic affinity between tribes in areas such as North Waziristan and the
Taliban, this has created a climate where fleeing Taliban have been welcomed as guests.

IMPLICATIONS: With
brewing disaffection that is taking violent expressions, the U.S. is truly in a dilemma in
Afghanistan. It relies on the Northern Alliance to keep security in Kabul, and cannot
alienate the Tajiks as long as the fight against Al Qaeda remnants continues. Yet it
depends on relations with a factual \'Southern Alliance\' in the Pashtun areas of
Afghanistan both to keep peace and to prosecute the war against Al Qaeda. Unlike the
battle-hardened Northern Alliance that had fought the Taliban for several years, the
Southern Alliance needed to be built from scratch. It relied mainly on former, pre-Taliban
governors of the main provinces, such as Gul Agha Sherzai in Kandahar. The Southern
Alliance is marred by three main weaknesses. First, it is militarily weak, never having
fought together in any serious fashion, unlike the Northern Alliance. Secondly, its
leadership is tainted by the past. It should be recalled that the lack of law and order
under their rule in 1992-94 and the mismanagement of these very leaders were factors that
provided a fertile ground for the emergence of the Taliban. With the victories of the
Taliban, they fled into exile, something that weighs heavily in honor-based societies like
the Pashtun. The former leaders have little legitimacy in trying to restore their
authority in areas they once fled. Thirdly, all its leaders have major interests, that
sometimes contradict one another, in the extensive trade and smuggling (including opium
and heroin) that takes place in Afghanistan and across the border with Pakistan.

In this precarious situation, the
glue that is holding the stability of southern Afghanistan together is the presence of
U.S. Special Forces. The Special Forces act as armed diplomats more than as fighters in
the area. They mediate conflicts among tribal leaders, and the Department of Defense and
the CIA distribute financial largesse in the form of cash (\'allied\' Afghan fighters are
paid handsomely), satellite telephones, Sport-Utility Vehicles, etc. Meanwhile, they hold
the amply proven deterrent of U.S. military might in their hands. But while the Special
Forces have so far kept the situation together, their presence is ultimately an artificial
glue, and their ability to keep fulfilling this function could be compromised if Pashtun
disaffection would explode if the upcoming Loya Jirga (Tribal Council) ends up
legitimizing the current, Tajik-dominated government setup. Basically, what the U.S. could
face then would not be \'remnants of Al Qaeda or the Taliban\', but a deeply rooted and
widespread disaffection among the Pashtuns of Afghanistan. This would not be a marginal,
extremist movement, but a mainstream nationalist opposition, a drastically different
phenomenon.

CONCLUSIONS: A
careful balancing act is necessary to keep order in Afghanistan. It is apparent to most
observers that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is understaffed and
needs to be greatly enhanced. With a larger ISAF, that is soon to come under Turkish
leadership, there would be a strong military contingent that would decrease U.S. reliance
on the Northern Alliance. And while Washington\'s toleration of the Northern Alliance power
grab is understandable under the circumstances, it has now reached a point where enough is
enough. One way of helping alleviate the Pashtun dissatisfaction is for the U.S. to get
more deeply involved in power-sharing among and between groups in Afghanistan. This
involves the risk of alienating the Panjsheri Tajiks, but failing to do so entails a much
more dangerous risk, that of a wider confrontation in the South, that could risk involving
the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan as well. The implications of such a scenario
are dire: most of the gains of the war so far, including U.S. ability to hunt down
remaining Al Qaeda groups, would be compromised, and the security of the entire region,
including General Musharraf\'s position in Pakistan, would be imperiled.

AUTHOR BIO: Awamdost Pakhtunkhel was a civil servant
in the ministry of culture of Afghanistan until the Communist takeover in 1978. After the
Soviet invasion, he joined the resistance movement, first as part of the Hizb-I-Islami
(Khalis) movement and then under Jalaluddin Haqqani. He briefly joined the Taliban
movement in 1995, before moving in disillusionment to his present home in the North
Waziristan agency of the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan in 1997, from where he
frequently writes on Afghan politics in the regional media.

Copyright 2001 The Analyst.

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